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MERGER CLASS ACTIONS IN DELAWARE AND 
THE SYMPTOMS OF MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL 
LITIGATION 
ADAM B. BADAWI

 
ABSTRACT 
Recent research on corporate litigation has focused on three trends: 
the growth in percentage of mergers that result in litigation, the migration 
of cases away from Delaware, and the increasing prevalence of merger 
litigation occurring simultaneously in multiple jurisdictions. This Article 
uses a new and unique dataset of public company litigation to track how 
these trends have affected filings and litigation tactics in the Delaware 
Court of Chancery from 2004 to 2011. The data confirm that Delaware 
appears to have experienced a decline in filings during the early and 
middle periods of the sample, but the data also shows that there has been 
a sharp increase in the number of the number of acqusition-related cases 
filed in Delaware in 2010 and 2011. 
The rise of concurrent, multi-jurisdictional litigation and the litigation 
tactics that it encourages are the likely reasons for the growth of 
acquisition-related cases in Delaware. While some plaintiffs’ attorneys 
may have left Delaware to escape the Chancery’s threats of lower 
attorneys’ fees and merit-based selection of lead counsel, in the current 
environment a Delaware filing may provide strategic advantages as 
foreign jurisdictions become saturated with filings. For example, lawyers 
may try to take control of a case by moving for expedited proceedings in 
Delaware or they may try to complicate negotations over the selection of 
lead plaintiffs’ counsel. The threat of using these tactics may increase the 
possibility that a plaintiff will receive some share of a fee award either in 
Delaware or in a case being litigated elsewhere. 
This Article explores how the rules Delaware uses to manage deal 
cases may enable strategic behavior in the context of multi-jurisdictional 
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litigation. This discussion provides reasons to believe that the use of 
tactics such as requesting expedited proceedings, contesting consolidation 
of cases, and involving out-of-state counsel earlier in proceedings should 
increase as multi-jurisdictional litigation increases. The empirical 
evidence provides substantial support for these theories. The Article 
concludes with an assessment of how the observed increase in strategic 
tactics may affect debates over how and whether to respond to the rise of 
multi-jurisdictional litigation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent scholarship on corporate litigation in the United States has 
focused on three trends. The first is the substantial growth in the 
percentage of mergers and acquisitions that have been subject to court 
challenges. In the 1999–2000 period, a study of all announced mergers and 
acquisitions offers found that 10% of those deals were subject to 
litigation.
1
 By 2011, that number had climbed to over 94%, at least for 
larger deals.
2
 The second trend traces the increasing threat to Delaware—
and specifically the corporate-focused Court of Chancery—as the nerve 
center of corporate litigation. Recent articles by John Armour, Bernard 
Black, and Brian Cheffins (“ABC”) argue that, at least until 2009, 
Delaware has been losing market share in important areas of corporate 
litigation.
3
 The final trend is the recent and striking increase in the number 
of acquisition-related cases that are litigated across multiple forums. For 
cases that meet their size threshold, Matt Cain and Steven Davidoff show 
that the percentages of transactions that have produced lawsuits in more 
than one jurisdiction has increased from 8.6% in 2005 to 47.6% in 2010.
4
 
 
 
 1. See C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and Acquisitions, J. CORP. 
FIN. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2, 34), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab 
stract_id=1722227. 
 2. This number is for deals over $100 million that have a per share price of five dollars or more. 
See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2011, at 1–2 (Feb. 2, 2012) 
(working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1998482. It is important 
to note that the growth in the absolute number of challenges to mergers has not been as dramatic over 
this time period. See discussion infra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 3. See John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases? (Northwestern Law & Econ. Research 
Paper No. 10-03, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578404; John 
Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L. J. 1345 (2012). Another recent study by Matthew 
Cain and Steven Davidoff finds more mixed views with respect to Delaware’s loss of market share 
while also suggesting that states have been competing for these cases through a combination of 
increased settlement rates and increased attorney awards. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, 
A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation (Apr. 2012) (working paper), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984758. 
 4. Cain and Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2011, supra note 2, at 2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/10
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There are pressing questions as to what accounts for these changes and 
about how these trends may be affecting the Court of Chancery’s status as 
the preeminent court for corporate litigation.
5
 This Article provides insight 
to these questions by extracting a sizable sample of cases involving public 
companies from a dataset that consists of every civil case filed in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery from 2004 to 2011. The dataset allows for 
the tracking of trends in case mix, party makeup, law firm appearance, the 
involvement of out-of-state counsel, and the actions taken by the parties 
and the court in these cases. The dataset’s focus on Delaware means that it 
cannot provide definitive answers to the questions raised by trends in the 
national case mix or about how precisely Delaware is faring in 
interjursidictional competition, it can provide a comprehensive picture of 
the long-term trends in Delaware’s specific case mix and can show how 
the symptoms of the increase in multi-jurisdictional litigation are affecting 
Delaware lawsuits. 
Several patterns emerge from this examination of eight years worth of 
docket data. Some of these trends are consistent with previous research 
and others suggest that there have been some important recent changes in 
the way corporate litigation proceeds in Delaware. While earlier studies 
have found indications that acquisition-related class actions are the 
predominant form of corporate litigation in Delaware,
6
 this study shows 
that the makeup of the Chancery docket has fluctuated quite widely over 
the course of the sample. Despite the strong growth in the amount of 
acquisition-related litigation in the United States, ABC’s observations that 
Delaware appears to have been losing cases appear consistent with this 
study’s observation that this segment of cases did not grow during that 
time period and was not the dominant part of the docket that it had been in 
earlier times. But acquisition-related cases have returned to Delaware in 
force, and particularly so in the last two years of the study. As of 2011, 
acquisition-related class actions form a substantial majority of all public-
company cases filed in Delaware and their overall numbers are higher than 
during any other year in the sample.  
Both ABC and Cain and Davidoff have provided accounts of what may 
be driving the decisions that corporate plaintiffs’ attorneys make about 
 
 
 5. The literature that comments on Delaware’s stature as the leading forum for corporate law 
and litigation is vast. For an overview of the state of this scholarship, see ROBERTA ROMANO, 
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 114–51 (2d ed. 2010). 
 6. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: 
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 168 (2004) (showing that over the 1999–
2000 time period, 61 percent of lead complaints filed against public companies involved acquisition-
oriented class actions). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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where to file acquisition-related cases. ABC hypothesize that relatively 
harsh criticism of plaintiffs’ lawyers by Delaware courts, the potential for 
cuts in attorneys’ fee awards, and the move away from the pattern of 
awarding lead counsel status to the first to file a case may have contributed 
to the decision not to file in Delaware.
7
 Cain and Davidoff theorize, and 
provide some empirical support for, the notion that states compete for 
acquisition-related cases on the basis of attorneys’ fees and settlement 
rates.
8
 They suggest that state courts may adjust these factors to account 
for the loss of cases. These theories are all plausible and none of the data 
here refute them. 
But the recent boom in Delaware cases supports a narrative that has not 
been the focus of previous research on Delaware case flow or in the 
empirical literature on multi-jurisdictional litigation.
9
 It appears that filing 
a case in Delaware may provide a number of strategic benefits to out-of-
state counsel who have lost the race to the courthouse in a non-Delaware 
jurisdiction. Given that foreign jurisdictions often select lead counsel on 
the basis of the first to file the case, out-of-state counsel who lose the race 
to the courthouse have little to gain by filing in that foreign jurisdiction. If, 
however, these counsel have a plausible chance at being named as lead 
counsel in Delaware—where the selection of lead counsel largely depends 
on the size of a plaintiffs’ shareholdings and the perceived quality of its 
law firm
10—they can file in Delaware. Doing so provides the options of 
 
 
 7. Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3, at 1380. 
 8. See Cain & Davidoff, A Great Game, supra note 2. 
 9. There have already been several thoughtful assessments of the problem of multijurisidictional 
litigation in the context of merger litigation. Randall Thomas and Robert Thompson argue that the 
problem should be conceived as litigation over fee distribution rather than a matter of forum shopping. 
See Randall S. Thomas and Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits and 
Its Application to Multi-jurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. L. REV. 1753, 1791–1800 (2012) 
[hereinafter A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits]. They conclude that the social costs 
associated with this type of litigation are likely to be small because these cases are often not resource 
intensive. See id. at 1800–01. In light of this assessment, the authors conclude that the problem is not 
dire and that judicial comity is the most attractive manner to address this issue. See id. at 1804–06. See 
also Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, infra 
note 16 (likewise supporting judicial comity as the best approach to the problem). 
 10. Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3, at 1374. In TCW Technologies 
Limited Partnership v. Intermedia Communications, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 147 (Oct. 
17, 2000), former Chancellor Chandler expressly dismissed the notion that judges in Delaware 
consider which party had filed first when awarding lead counsel status. He declared there that such a 
belief was a “myth” which had “neither empirical nor logical support.” TCW, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
147, at *8–9. A six-factor test was eventually introduced in Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Service 
Company, LLC., which collected the various factors that the Delaware judges had been using to make 
decisions on lead counsel status. No. Civ. A. 19575, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2002). 
The factors listed by the court there were:  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/10
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going forward with the Delaware case or demanding to be part of the 
leadership structure in the foreign jurisdiction. And even if the plaintiffs’ 
counsel does not have a strong chance of being named lead counsel in 
Delaware, a Delaware filing may provide some leverage in Delaware or in 
a foreign jurisdiction. If there are plaintiffs who have a better chance of 
being named lead counsel in Delaware, other Delaware plaintiffs may be 
able to receive a small settlement in exchange for not fighting the 
consolidation of the case.  
A Delaware filing may also allow for procedural tactics that increase 
the expected value of a fee award. For example, a filing in Delaware 
allows a plaintiff to move for expedited proceedings there.
11
 A successful 
attempt to expedite can shift the focus of the case to the jurisdiction 
granting such a motion because the need to produce discovery can threaten 
the viability of the underlying deal. Likewise, a Delaware filing can allow 
a plaintiff to make a more credible objection to any settlement that occurs 
in a non-Delaware jurisdiction. This tactic may lead defendants to offer a 
share of the settlement to anyone threatening to make such an objection in 
order to end the litigation.
12
 These outcomes are better for plaintiffs’ 
counsel than being second to the courthouse in the foreign jurisdiction and 
getting nothing. 
The prospect of using a Delaware filing to counter cases filed in 
foreign jurisdictions is consistent with the data developed in this Article. 
The data show an increase in cases in Delaware, the recent growth in the 
active and early involvement of out-of-state counsel in Delaware cases, 
and a sharp increase in requests for expedited proceedings in acquisition-
related cases. While commentators on multi-jurisdictional litigation have 
hinted at some of these tactics, this Article is the first empirical effort to 
 
 
(1) “the quality of the pleadings . . . .”; (2) “the relative economic stakes of the competing 
litigants in the outcome of the case (to be accorded ‘great weight’)”; (3) the firm’s perceived 
“willingness and ability . . . to litigate vigorously on behalf of entire class . . . .”; (4) “the 
absence of any conflict between larger, often institutional . . . and smaller stockholders”; 
(5) “the enthusiasm . . . with which the . . . contestants have prosecuted the lawsuit”; and 
(6) the perceived “competence of [the involved] counsel . . . .”  
Id. (footnotes omitted). Although the Hirt test remains unchanged, in a recent decision Vice 
Chancellor Glasscock articulated that the factor test was more of a guide and that “the Court’s 
overriding goal is [to] establish a leadership structure that will provide effective representation to the 
stockholder’s class.” In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 424886, at 
*1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2012) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 11. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1077 (2000) (discussing the willingness of Delaware courts to 
grant expedited proceedings). 
 12. See discussion of how a foreign filing may aid objections to settlements infra at notes 63–66 
and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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document how this strategic behavior has affected litigation in the Court of 
Chancery.
13
  
The development of these strategies is potentially troubling because it 
means that the rise of multi-jurisdictional litigation may be increasing 
procedural burdens on courts. For Delaware, there is some irony in this 
development because the weight of this burden may be a consequence of 
adjustments Delaware made to control its docket when it had a quasi-
monopoly on corporate litigation. For example, Delaware’s move away 
from first to file in favor of merit-based selection has been attributed to the 
Chancery’s desire to eliminate the low quality of filings that can come 
with a race to the courthouse.
14
 Yet this move to a merit-based standard 
has created some uncertainty that plaintiffs’ counsel may be able to 
leverage when litigation occurs across jurisdictions.
15
 This strategic 
advantage may draw the very filings that Delaware sought to avoid by 
moving away from the first-to-file rule. This potential loss of control and 
the procedural machinations it requires have led to a series of proposals 
that would address the issues raised by multi-jurisdictional litigation.
16
 The 
evidence developed in this Article helps to situtate and evaluate the 
offered solutions. 
 
 
 13. Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who Caused This 
Problem, and Can it Be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L 1, 5–12 (2012); Cain & Davidoff, A Great Game, 
supra note 2, at 4, 13–14; Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3, at 1384–89. 
 14. See Thomas & Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits, supra note 9, at 
1805–06 (“Delaware judges have been outspoken in recent years about their perceptions of class 
counsel's abuses in the deal litigation process. . . . Perhaps as a result, the Delaware Chancery Court 
moved to implement a form of lead plaintiff provision.”).  
 15. The Chancery continues to have to deal with what it views as hastily filed, thin complaints. 
See infra note 36. 
 16. There have been several proposals for how to deal with the potential problems posed by 
multi-jurisdictional merger litigation. One such proposal would allow companies to use charter 
amendments or bylaws to designate specific courts for potential merger litigation. See, e.g., Joseph 
Grundfest, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate Litigation: Mandatory and Elective 
Approaches, 15–16, 24 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ. Working Paper No. 91, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1690561; Ted Mirvis, 
Anywhere But Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests Some Solutions, M&A J., May 
17, 2007, at 17 (citing the endorsement of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz’s Ted Mirvis to this 
approach). Other proposals would rely on federal legislation to help centralize merger litigation. See 
Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3, at 1395–96 (discussing a proposal to 
consolidate multi-jurisdictional litigation in the state of incorporation), And still other proposals seek 
to defend the current multi-forum approach, albeit with some improvements to the mechanics of the 
current system’s operation. See Thompson & Thomas, A Theory of Representative Shareholder 
Litigation, supra note 9 at 1803–05 (advocating the use of judicial comity to manage multi-
jurisdictional litigation); Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger 
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (arguing for a system of horizontal comity that 
would minimize opportunism while also improving the coordination and communication across 
jurisdictions).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/10
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* * * 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews the empirical literature 
on Delaware corporate litigation and acquisition-related litigation in the 
United States. It begins with the Thompson and Thomas study, which 
offers the most comprehensive study to date of the Delaware Chancery 
Court’s docket.17 That study performed a census of the cases filed in the 
Chancery Court in 1999 and 2000.
18
 While the data in that study show that 
the trend of acquisition-related litigation making up a large share of the 
Chancery Court’s docket is not a new one, that paper also examined a time 
period when Delaware was the unquestioned center of corporate litigation. 
Part of the goal of this Article is to examine this trend in the years when 
that status has been called into question. ABC have two recent papers that 
collect empirical evidence bearing on the claim that cases have migrated 
away from Delaware.
19
 ABC do not conduct a census, but they do survey a 
number of areas across jurisdictions and find that Delaware’s market share 
of derivative cases and stock option backdating cases appears to have 
declined in the period from the mid-1990s to 2009.
20
 ABC have also 
authored a recent companion paper arguing that part of the reason for this 
trend is the fragmentation of the plaintiffs’ bar.21 Cain and Davidoff 
conduct an empirical study that provides an in-depth examination of 
interjurisdictional competition in cases involving mergers and 
acquisitions.
22
 That paper provides some evidence about trends in merger 
litigation and about what may be driving interjurisdictional competition. 
Part II uses a new dataset that surveys the Chancery Court’s docket 
from a period beginning in 2004 and stretching through 2011. The dataset 
includes every civil case filed in Delaware during that period, which 
comprises a total of over 7000 unique case numbers. Through fuzzy 
matching techniques, a sample of 996 unique cases involving public 
companies has been extracted. The chief benefit of this dataset relative to 
those used in the other studies is that it provides a long-term picture of the 
case mix in the Chancery Court. Each case was coded for topic, 
uniqueness (i.e., whether any follow-on cases were filed), the presence of 
 
 
 17. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 6. 
 18. Id. at 165. 
 19. See Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, supra note 3; Armour et al., Delaware’s 
Balancing Act, supra note 3. 
 20. See Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, supra note 3; Armour et al., Delaware’s 
Balancing Act, supra note 3. 
 21. Brian Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ 
Bar, 2012 COL. BUS. LAW. REV. 427 (2012). 
 22. See Cain & Davidoff, A Great Game, supra note 2. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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an institutional plaintiff, the Delaware law firms appearing in the case, the 
admission of out-of-state counsel (through pro hac vice motions), and 
eventual outcome. This Part reviews the trends that these variables 
demonstrate over the 2004–11 time frame. 
Part III explores the implications of the data developed in Part II. The 
dataset shows changes in the Chancery Court’s case mix that are 
consistent with the claims that cases have left Delaware, an inference 
aided by evidence of the amount of litigation going on in other 
jurisdictions at the time. But the data also show a resurgence of Delaware 
litigation in 2010 and 2011, with the bulk of this change being due to 
acquisition-related cases. When one digs into the docket to try and 
understand what lies behind this change, several trends emerge. First, 
Delaware’s efforts to increase the amount of shares that lead plaintiffs 
hold by prioritizing institutional plaintiffs does appear to have produced 
more involvement by these plaintiffs. Second, this effort, along with the 
threat to cut attorneys’ fee awards during settlement has not, ultimately, 
appeared to have stemmed the practice of piling on Delaware lawsuits in 
acquisition-related challenges. Filings have exploded in recent years and 
those trends appear to be driven by out-of-state counsel who may have left 
Delaware in significant numbers during the early part of the sample 
period. This Part explores whether the growth of multijurisdiction 
litigation has led to a situation where the out-of-state plaintiffs use the 
possibility of Delaware litigation as leverage in the battle for a share of 
settlement fees. 
I. RELATED RESEARCH ON CORPORATE LITIGATION 
The Thompson and Thomas study of 2004 is the most in-depth study of 
the Delaware Chancery Court’s docket. Through their census of cases filed 
in that court during 1999 and 2000, Thompson and Thomas found what 
they called the “new look of shareholder litigation.”23 This look was of 
acquisition-related cases, which were the predominant type of litigation in 
the Chancery Court during that time period. Of the 1048 cases filed in the 
Chancery Court that involved fiduciary duty claims against public 
companies during these two years, 813 (77.6%) were related to 
acquisitions and, of those 813 cases, 772 (94.9%) were class actions.
24
 
This percentage, however, drops to 61.2% when one only considers lead 
complaints because these complaints tend to draw more follow-on 
 
 
 23. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 6. 
 24. Id. at 169. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/10
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filings.
25
 For the purposes of this study, the most important fact developed 
by the Thompson and Thomas data is that acquisition-related litigation 
made up a large part of the fiduciary duty-rooted class actions during a 
period when Delaware was the unchallenged center for corporate litigation 
in the United States.
26
 
Subsequent research has established the three trends identified in the 
introduction: the growth in the percentage of challenged deals, the 
migration of cases out of Delaware, and the increase in multi-jurisdictional 
litigation. With respect to challenged deals, Cain and Davidoff show that 
the percentage of transactions over $100 million with an offer price of at 
least five dollars per share that result in litigation has climbed from 
roughly 39% in 2005 to over 94% in 2011.
27
 The change in the absolute 
number of cases, however, has not been as dramatic. Between 2005 and 
2007 the number of acqusitions that resulted in litigation varied between 
70 and 97.
28
 During 2008 and 2009, the worst years of the financial crisis, 
the number of cases was 50 and 60 respectively.
29
 That litigation 
rebounded in 2010 when 105 cases were filed and stayed high in 2011 
when plaintiffs filed 97 cases.
30
 It is unclear whether these trends portend a 
world in which nearly every deal gets challenged or a situation which 
allows for a capacity of about 100 challenged deals a year.
31
 
The battlegrounds for acquisition-related cases have been in flux. As 
ABC document, Delaware—at least for a time—was losing some of these 
cases. In their studies showing this trend, the authors demonstrate that, 
when it comes to the largest merger transactions, Delaware has 
transitioned from being the dominant forum for litigation to being one of a 
number of players. From 1994 to 2001, every single one of the twenty-five 
largest deals for each year resulted in a case filed in Delaware when the 
transaction involved a company incorporated in Delaware.
32
 But from 
 
 
 25. Id. at 168. 
 26. Id. at 169. 
 27. Cain & Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2011, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
 28. Id. at 2. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Thomas & Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits, supra note 9, at 
1789 (interpreting the Cain and Davidoff data to mean that “the problem we are addressing is an 
increase in the amount of multi-jurisdictional litigation and not an increase in the number of deals 
attracting litigation.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3, at 1356–58. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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2006 to 2009, almost half of the deals included in this bracket did not 
involve a Delaware case at all.
33
  
The trend of acquisition-related cases leaving Delaware is also 
apparent from ABC’s analysis of leveraged buyout transactions (“LBOs”). 
As the authors note, these going-private transactions are “litigation prone, 
and for good reason.”34 Insiders in the company are often on the side of the 
company that wants to take the company private and one may wonder 
whether they will do the utmost to maximize the transaction price. ABC’s 
study reviews the trend of litigation involving LBO targets incorporated in 
Delaware and finds a pattern similar to that seen in the largest merger 
transactions. While Delaware used to be the chief locale for this specific 
sort of litigation, its dominance began to decline around 2002. The study 
shows that, between 1997 and 2001, 73% of all lawsuits challenging LBOs 
were filed in Delaware, while that figure dropped to 45% for the period 
from 2002 to 2009.
35
 
ABC offer a number of theories that might explain the observed out-of-
Delaware trend. This Article raises four of the arguments that have been 
put forward by ABC. The first argument focuses on the Chancery Court’s 
criticism of weak filings that some might view as an indication of a pro-
defendant orientation.
36
 Based on these comments, ABC suggest that this 
behavior may have led to plaintiffs’ attorneys taking cases to courts where 
the judiciary did not share these sentiments. At the same time, the authors 
share their own impression that Delaware law has not shifted notably in 
favor of defendants in the period where the exodus from Delaware was 
observed. ABC also discuss interviews with plaintiffs’ counsel who still 
favor Delaware as a forum despite the changes that have occurred over the 
last fifteen or so years.
37
 
A second reason ABC cite to explain the loss of cases in Delaware 
concerns direct financial incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys. The authors 
note that, in a number of cases, the Chancery has cut the attorneys’ fees 
that plaintiffs and defendants have agreed to in settlements.
38
 ABC suggest 
 
 
 33. Id.; see also id. at 1347 (citing Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and 
Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 155–56 (2011), and Jennifer 
J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)). 
 34. Armour, et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3, at 1359. 
 35. Id. at 1360–61. 
 36. Id. at 1367–70. Perhaps the most direct evidence that ABC cite of this claim is a quote by 
Vice-Chancellor Laster: “a lot of these sue-on-every-deal cases are . . . worthless, they’re simply we 
see the announcement, then we file, okay?” Id. at 1369 (quoting Courtroom Status Conference at 16, 
Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, C.A. No. 5890–VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010)). 
 37. See id. at 1369–70. 
 38. Id. at 1370–72. 
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that this type of aggressive scrutiny was not the case during an earlier 
period. But sometime after 2000, the Chancery began to question the fee 
requests and fee settlements that lawyers brought to them and sometimes 
cut these fees in a significant way. ABC suggest that the fee cutting 
behavior may have contributed to the exit, but they note that the move 
away from Delaware appears to have started before the increased scrutiny 
of fees began.
39
 It is also noteworthy that, despite apparent additional 
scrutiny in cases that it determines to be weak, the Chancery has not been 
shy about awarding very large fees where plaintiffs’ attorneys have 
brought strong cases. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court recently 
affirmed a $300 million fee awarded by the Chancery in a derivative 
lawsuit that challenged a controlling shareholder transaction.
40
  
A third theory is that changes to the criteria for the selection of lead 
counsel have created an incentive for firms to file outside of Delaware. For 
many years, the tradition of the Chancery was to respect the negotiation 
among plaintiffs’ attorneys to select the lead counsel. If, however, this 
process did not produce a consensus, it would then be left to the Chancery 
to make a selection of lead counsel. ABC document that the Chancery 
used the standards for selection stated in the PSLRA as a guide for 
developing the appropriate test, with particular emphasis on the presence 
of institutional shareholders who tend to have more concentrated interests 
than other plaintiffs and thus may be in a better position to monitor 
counsel.
41
 As this process has evolved, the Chancery has also emphasized 
its perception of the skill of the law firms seeking the role of lead counsel 
in making the ultimate determination.
42
 While first-to-file status 
sometimes still matters in close cases in Delaware, ABC argue that it 
matters more elsewhere, and consequently, these changes may have led to 
filings elsewhere. 
 
 
 39. Id. at 1372. 
 40. See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (2012). Controlling shareholder 
transactions pose a particularly high risk of self-dealing. In a typical transaction of this sort a 
shareholder with a majority interest will sell one company to another company controlled by the 
controlling shareholder. The danger in these situations is that the controlling shareholder will sell at an 
inappropriately low price because that shareholder is on both sides of the transaction. The damages in 
these types of cases can be very large because they can be based on the difference between the price 
paid and the price warranted through a neutral evaluation of the price. The relative rarity of these cases 
means, however, that the large fees they entail tend to be outliers. 
 41. Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3, at 1374. 
 42. Id.; see also id. n.145 (collecting a series of examples where the Chancery awarded lead 
counsel status to firms that did not have the largest shareholders as clients based on their perceptions 
of the abilities of those firms). 
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A final explanation comes from a related paper on the role of the 
plaintiffs’ bar in driving corporate litigation.43 ABC argue that the 
plaintiffs’ bar has become increasingly fragmented and that this 
competition has worn away at the traditional advantages that Delaware 
offered as a forum for out-of-state counsel. Perhaps the most important of 
these advantages was a willingness to grant pro hac vice motions, which 
allows out-of-state counsel to appear in a case, with little complication.
44
 
ABC document that this willingness to admit out-of-state lawyers has 
become a national trend, the timing of which roughly corresponds with the 
movement of cases out of Delaware.
45
 The authors argue that being at the 
forefront of this approach allowed out-of-state counsel to forge strong 
relationships both with in-state counsel and with the Delaware judiciary.
46
 
As other states have become more willing to allow out-of-state counsel to 
appear, parallel relationships may be forming elsewhere in a way that 
contributes to cases leaving Delaware. 
The work of Cain and Davidoff also has a close relationship with the 
dataset used in this Article. In A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation, Cain and Davidoff examine a dataset of the 
litigation produced by every merger and acquisition where the total 
consideration is at least $100 million and the per-share price is at least five 
dollars from 2005 to 2010. That study develops data on award fees and 
dismissal rates and attempts to explain how those factors may contribute to 
the decision of where to file a case.
47
 They suggest that there are two 
possible effects at work: attorneys selecting jurisdictions based on the 
prospect of a large award—as measured by both the dismissal rate and 
average award—and the response of courts to try and attract cases by 
offering higher expected awards.
48
 The authors attempt to identify any 
potential relationship between these mechanisms by calculating the 
cumulative residuals for regressions that use settlement rates and 
 
 
 43. Cheffins et al., supra note 21. 
 44. Id. at 462–63. 
 45. Id. at 484–89 (noting that, by 2002, the ABA had endorsed a model rule that embraced a 
generous approach to the granting of pro hac vice motions and that, as of 2010, the ABA deemed 
compliance with the rule “very good.”). 
 46. Id. at 462 (noting that some out-of-state counsel are on a “first-name basis” with Delaware 
judges) (citing REPORT OF THE MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO DENNIS L. 
SCHRADER, ESQUIRE, PRESIDENT, DELAWARE STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 21 (Apr. 23, 2001)); id. at 
465–66 (documenting the book filing system for out-of-state plaintiffs run by Morris & Rosenthal, 
which has long been a leading Delaware plaintiffs’ firm). 
 47. See Cain & Davidoff, A Great Game, supra note 2. 
 48. Id. at 4–5. 
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attorneys’ fee awards as the dependent variables on the basis of a number 
of case-specific independent variables.
49
  
Cain and Davidoff use the residuals from the first set of regressions as 
independent variables in logistic regressions that use the decision whether 
to file in the headquarters state or the incorporation state as the dependent 
variable. Their analysis finds some mixed support for the view that there is 
a correlation between the higher rates of settlement/higher average amount 
of awards and the rate at which attorneys file suit in these jurisdictions.
50
 
With regard to how courts respond, the authors find weaker support for the 
hypothesis that a loss of cases has a correlation with a subsequent increase 
in settlements and/or average awards.
51
 The authors do, however, have a 
result that suggests that Delaware courts may raise their settlement rates if 
cases have recently been migrating to other jurisdictions.
52
 
The ability of Cain and Davidoff to make causal claims depends, in 
some ways, on their ability to control for case quality. Indeed, the authors 
state that their results must “be viewed with caution, as it is difficult to 
fully control for endogeneity in the competition arena.”53 The variables 
that they use to control for case-specific factors include many that one 
would ideally use to assess the quality of a case. But some other factors, 
such as the presence of institutional shareholders as parties and some 
measure of the ability of the lawyers filing the case, are not included. Any 
uncontrolled-for factors might be an issue because the selection effects 
that are potentially at play here provide some potential alternative 
explanations for the patterns that the paper documents. One particular 
concern is that plaintiffs’ attorneys seek to file cases of different quality in 
different jurisdictions. For example, plaintiffs’ lawyers may be bringing 
higher quality lawsuits in Delaware over time, which could account for the 
higher settlement rates that the authors observe, rather than their 
suggestion that “Delaware responds to losing cases by raising its 
settlement rates.”54 In other words, it is possible that Delaware judges base 
 
 
 49. Id. at 17–19. These independent variables include the size of the transaction, whether the 
consideration was cash, the presence of a management buyout, the use of tender offers, whether the 
case had a low offer premium, and number of cases filed. Id. The authors suggest that the number of 
cases filed “may proxy for the merits of a case along dimensions that we fail to capture in the other 
variables.” Id. at 18. 
 50. Id. at 22–24. 
 51. Id. at 24–26. 
 52. Id. at 25. 
 53. Id. at 26. 
 54. Id. at 25. 
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their attorneys’ fee awards or settlement decisions largely on the merits 
rather than on their potential effect on interjurisdictional competition. 
A follow-up paper by Cain and Davidoff develops important evidence 
of overall trends in merger litigation and also provides some indications 
that cases are returning to Delaware. That paper, which adds 2011 
numbers to their Great Game study, shows that the percentage of $100 
million-plus deals with prices over five dollars per share resulting in 
Delaware litigation may have bottomed out in the 2007–2008 stretch. In 
those years, the percentage of deals where related litigation could 
conceivably go to Delaware—either because the company was 
headquartered there, incorporated there, or both—was 34.4% and 26.9%, 
respectively.
55
 For 2009–2011, the equivalent numbers were 58.1%, 
44.1%, and 64.3%, respectively.
56
 
The Cain and Davidoff update also speaks to the third important trend 
in corporate litigation: the rather dramatic recent increase in multi-
jurisdictional litigation.
57
 The percentage of cases that meet Cain and 
Davidoff’s threshold and have involved litigation in multiple states has 
grown from 8.6% in 2005 to 47.4% in 2011.
58
 Whether this development 
is a problem that warrants a regulated solution remains to be seen, but the 
lack of central coordination has prompted some concerns. One lawyer told 
the Chancery that there are “no rules” when it comes to resolving multi-
jurisdictional litigation and a number of Delaware judges have expressed 
their frustration on this issue.
59
 Some commentators have suggested a 
cautious approach to regulation that allows the process of judicial comity 
to manage litigation across different jurisdictions. For example, Former-
Chancellor Chandler expressed his desire that defense counsel file a 
motion in all the courts with cases pending asking that “those 
 
 
 55. Cain & Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2011, supra note 2, at 5. 
 56. Id. 
 57. For one take on the causes and possible consequences of multi-jurisdictional litigation by two 
practicing attorneys, see Micheletti and Parker, supra note 13. 
 58. Id. at 2. 
 59. See David Marcus, Delaware’s Chancery Grapples with Multijurisdictional Litigation, THE 
DEAL MAG. (Dec. 9, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/043316/2011/delaware’s 
-chancery-grapples-with-multi-jurisdictional-litigation.php (noting that Delaware lawyer, Gregory 
Williams, prepared a special report for Vice-Chancellor Laster in the Nighthawk litigation suggesting 
that multi-jurisdictional litigation is an “inevitable byproduct of [the] federal system.”); Armour et al., 
Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3, at 1386 nn.218–20 (noting Vice Chancellor Laster’s refusal 
to stay the case in Parcell v. Southwall Technologies and his accompanying statements indicating that 
he regretted that the internal affairs doctrine was not more strictly adhered to so that Delaware’s 
handling of Delaware corporation cases would not be so frequently challenged.) (citing 
Teleconference, Parcell v. Southwall Techs., Inc., C.A. No. 7003–VCL, at *11–15 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 
2011)). 
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judges. . . confer and agree upon, in the interest of comity and judicial 
efficiency, . . . what jurisdiction is going to proceed and go forward and 
which jurisdictions are going to stand down and allow one jurisdiction to 
handle the matter.”60 
Several scholars have endorsed an approach that is similar to the one 
put forward by Chancellor Chandler. Thomas and Thompson argue that 
judicial comity is likely to be able to address the problem and, if it cannot, 
is easily reversible. Lahav and Griffith argue that this approach may allow 
Delaware to reserve the most important cases for itself while leaving the 
less important cases to courts that do not specialize in corporate law. At 
the same time, some current members of the Chancery appear to believe 
that its members should be more aggressive about ensuring that important 
corporate cases remain in Delaware.
61
  
Multijurisdictional litigation creates new strategic possibilities for 
plaintiffs’ counsel. Two options that are available to attorneys are pressing 
for expedited proceedings and filing a case in another jurisdiction to 
buttress an objection in a similar case filed elsewhere. Requests for fast 
tracking litigation have long been part of merger litigation; a successful 
motion for expedited discovery or for a preliminary injunction can threaten 
a deal, which can create intense pressure to settle.
62
 Fast-tracking may take 
on added significance in the context of multi-forum litigation. If 
competing groups of attorneys are challenging a deal in different 
jurisdictions, the value of winning a motion to expedite proceedings in one 
of them may be even larger because the leverage that the court order 
provides may allow those attorneys to seize control over negotiations with 
defense counsel. As multi-forum litigation increases, the value of winning 
a motion to expedite proceedings should also increase because it can 
convert a situation where a group of lawyers faces a low possibility of a 
fee award to a situation where there is a much higher probability that those 
lawyers will obtain an award. 
 
 
 60. In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 5022–CC, 2011 WL 1135016, at *4 
n.12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Peter B. Ladig, Multi-
Jurisdictional Litigation a Rich Vein of Issues for Chancery Court, DEL. BUS. CT. INSIDER (Apr. 20, 
2011), http://www.morrisjames.com/news/xprNewsDetail.aspx?xpST=NewsDetail&news=185. 
 61. See infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 62. See Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 
66 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm? abstract_id=2155809 (explaining that a preliminary injunction to enjoin a merger or the 
grant of a motion for expedited discovery can undermine a transaction thus creating an environment 
where defense counsel want to settle the case quickly). 
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If winning a motion to expedite creates greater returns in a world of 
multi-jurisdictional litigation, plaintiffs’ lawyers should be more willing to 
take a chance on these motions. Indeed, this prospect of winning a motion 
to expedite may be a motivating reason for filing a case in a different 
jurisdiction and may, accordingly, be a contributing factor to the growth of 
multi-forum litigation. Courts worried about losing market share may 
follow a similar logic. By being more willing to grant expedited motions, 
these courts may be a more attractive location to litigate. 
While the strategic dynamics associated with expedited proceedings 
across multiple jurisdictions have not been the subject of much 
commentary, there has been a fairly significant amount of discussion about 
the costs and benefits associated with objectors.
63
 In non-acquisition 
related class actions, objectors to any settlement can sometimes be 
uninformed or inactive in the litigation process.
64
 In the context of merger 
litigation, however, those who object to settlements are often those who 
have a stake in litigation proceeding in another jurisdiction.
65
 In these 
situations, the objectors have the potential to guard against the practice of 
collusive settlements that may occur when defense counsel deal with 
groups of plaintiffs’ attorneys that are competing across multiple 
jurisdictions.
66
 The fact that the objectors have filed a case in another 
jurisdiction may make any argument they bring against settlement a 
stronger claim than an average member of the class might have. And, of 
 
 
 63. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 405, 411 (explaining 
that objectors to class action and derivative suits can improve the evidentiary record associated with 
settlements). 
 64. See Griffith & Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Litigation, supra note 16, at 31 (citing 
Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. 
CHI. L. F. 403; Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (2010). 
 65. Hillary Sale has argued that one of the best protections against the potential for collusion is 
aggressive gatekeeping by judges during settlement proceedings. See Sale, supra note 63, at 414 
(advocating that judges place “greater scrutiny of the role of defense counsel and insurers, both of 
whom amplify agency costs and contribute to collusive settlements.”). As an example of this more 
aggressive approach, Sale details Judge Posner’s rejection of a collusive settlement in Reynolds v. 
Beneficial National Bank. Id. at 393–96 (citing 288 F.3d 277 (2002)). She argues that Judge Posner 
directed appropriate scrutiny to the role of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, but should have conducted a more 
exacting examination of the conduct of defense counsel. Id. at 393. 
 66. Griffith & Lahav, supra note 16, at 31–32. Jack Coffee coined the phrase “reverse auction” 
to describe this practice. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class 
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370–72 (1995) (“[The] ‘reverse auction’ [is] a jurisdictional 
competition among different teams of plaintiffs’attorneys in different actions that involve the same 
underlying allegations. . . . The practical impact of this approach is that it allows the defendants to pick 
and choose the plaintiff team with which they will deal. Indeed, it signals to the unscrupulous 
plaintiffs’ attorney that by filing a parallel, shadow action in state court, it can underbid the original 
plaintiffs’ attorney team that researched, prepared and filed the action. The net result is that defendants 
can seek the lowest bidder from among these rival groups and negotiate with each simultaneously.”). 
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course, the better this claim is, the more likely it is that objectors will be 
given some share of any settlement to drop their objection. Given that 
filing a case in another jurisdiction can increase the potential to receive 
part of any ultimate settlement, one should expect this possibility to 
increase the likelihood that counsel will want to file a case in another 
jurisdiction. 
Delaware’s impact on corporate law should not, of course, be measured 
solely by case filings and litigation outcomes. Part of Delaware’s 
dominance derives from the choice of its law in major financial 
transactions. Two recent studies document that, perhaps in contrast to 
litigation measures, Delaware’s role is on the rise in transactional contexts. 
One of these papers, by Cain and Davidoff, tracks the use of Delaware law 
in merger agreements from 2004 to 2008.
67
 The authors find that over this 
period, merger agreements increasingly selected Delaware law to govern 
the agreement and chose Delaware as a forum to litigate any dispute, a 
trend that accelerated during the financial crisis.
68
 Broughman, Fried, and 
Ibrahim also look at the prevalence of Delaware law outside of the 
litigation context by examining the incorporation and reincorporation 
decisions of venture capital backed startups.
69
 They find that these firms 
often choose Delaware law because it acts as a “lingua franca” for 
investors that come from different states.
70
 The authors infer from this 
finding that one reason for Delaware’s endurance may not be its inherent 
quality, but instead the fact that it is a common language among 
financially sophisticated parties.
71
 
II. LONG TERM TRENDS IN DELAWARE PUBLIC COMPANY LITIGATION 
This Article uses a dataset that begins with every docket entry in the 
Delaware Chancery Court for cases categorized as “Civil” from the 
beginning of 2004 through the end of 2011. The data come from 
Westlaw’s electronic coverage of that docket, which began in October 
2003. Because the 2003 entries largely involve cases that were in progress, 
and hence often do not provide electronic access to the complaints, the 
 
 
 67. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive Reach, 9 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 92 (2012). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried & Darian M. Ibrahim, Delaware Law as Lingua 
Franca: Evidence from VC-Backed Startups (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 12-38, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa pers.cfm?abstract_id=2117967. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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dataset used in this Article omits those observations from the analysis. 
This docket data includes 7418 unique case numbers and involves 43,441 
parties. From this initial dataset, a subset of cases involving publicly 
traded companies was extracted. A “fuzzy” matching algorithm compared 
the names of parties from the docket with the names of publicly available 
companies extracted from the US Stock database put together by the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (“CRSP”).72 The results of these 
fuzzy matches were then hand-checked to confirm actual matches. This 
process resulted in a total of 1380 non-unique cases involving 1649 public 
companies. To be sure, this method does not ensure that the resulting 
dataset includes all of the public companies involved in litigation in the 
Chancery Court. The subset should be regarded as a sample of public 
company litigation, although there does not appear to be any compelling 
reason to believe that the matching method would bias the sample in a 
discernable way.
73
 
The dataset offers several advantages over the existing studies. First, it 
begins with every case filed in the Chancery, which allows a level of depth 
that most studies cannot provide because other approaches often focus on 
cases that produce opinions or involve deals that are over a given 
threshold of money. This feature allows the study to examine whether the 
trends in smaller stakes cases track the trends in larger stakes cases. 
Second, this dataset faces fewer bounds on topic areas than many other 
litigation-based studies use. For example, the ABC papers and the Cain 
and Davidoff studies focus on specific topic areas of litigation.
74
 Third, 
this study covers a significant time frame and thus can track long-term 
trends.  
There are, of course, some disadvantages to this approach. The study 
uses a sample rather than a census so it cannot provide the same level of 
detail and the same level of certainty about the trends that the Thompson 
and Thomas study provides in the 1999–2000 time period.75 Another 
disadvantage is that the study does not track trends in other states as both 
 
 
 72. The algorithm used is Michael Blasnik’s RECLINK package for Stata. See Michael Blasnik, 
RECLINK: Stata Module to Probabilistically Match Records, Statistical Software Components 
S456876, Boston College Dep’t of Econ., available at http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocode 
:s456876 (revised Jan. 18, 2010). 
 73. However, bias may be possible if the cases involving public company subsidiaries, which are 
sometimes difficult to pick up through fuzzy matching, tend to differ in important ways from the cases 
that involve the parent companies. 
 74. See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3; Cain & Davidoff, A Great Game, 
supra note 2. 
 75. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 6. 
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the ABC papers and the Cain and Davidoff studies do.
76
 The lack of this 
feature means that the data can provide only limited insight about how 
litigation across multiple jurisdictions has affected the Delaware docket. 
For each case the complaint was coded for case topic and the number 
of follow-on cases filed.
77
 It is relatively common for plaintiffs to file 
multiple complaints based on the same set of facts and, accordingly, the 
presentation of the data distinguishes between the number of unique cases, 
which does not count any of the follow-up cases filed, and the overall 
number of cases, which does include the follow-up cases. The docket 
includes information on all parties to the action, the law firms involved, 
and a record of almost every action taken in the case. This section uses 
each of these sources of information to examine changes in the makeup of 
litigation over the period of the study with an emphasis on trying to 
understand how the parties and their lawyers have contributed to important 
shifts in corporate litigation in Delaware. 
The analysis begins with a discussion of the types of cases that have 
been filed over the study period with a focus on acquisition-related class 
actions. The ABC work suggests that, relative to the overall amount of 
acquisition-related activity and resulting court challenges, one should 
expect some decrease in the amount of this litigation during the early part 
of the study period if indeed Delaware lost cases to other jurisdictions. 
One should also expect a decrease in acquisition-related litigation in the 
period surrounding the financial crisis due to the overall decline in 
acquisitions during that period of constrained liquidity. The data are 
generally consistent with this picture, with the exception that there appears 
to be a substantial spike in the number of cases in the 2010 to 2011 time 
period. This subsection discusses several trends in the data that may be 
related to this apparent growth. 
The section continues with an examination of the parties and lawyers 
involved in public company litigation with an eye toward understanding 
how these features contributed to the observed trends in the Chancery’s 
case mix. Public companies involved in Delaware litigation are usually 
defendants, as one might expect. Indeed, over the course of the time period 
studied, public companies were defendants about 85% of the time. Perhaps 
a more interesting part of this analysis involves the role of institutional 
 
 
 76. See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3; Cain & Davidoff, A Great Game, 
supra note 2. 
 77. In a handful of cases the window of exclusion was extended beyond thirty days when it was 
apparent that the case involved the same issue as another recently filed case. 
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players, such as pension funds, in corporate litigation. In the securities 
arena, statutory changes have resulted in a more pronounced role for 
institutional plaintiffs in driving the course of litigation.
78
 There is some 
evidence that the Chancery is moving in this direction in non-securities 
corporate cases, and ABC argue that this effect may be one of the 
contributing factors to the migration of cases away from Delaware.
79
 
Indeed, there is some evidence that plaintiffs’ counsel have reacted to 
Delaware’s suggestion that they recruit institutional clients, as the 
numbers of cases involving these types of clients has increased over the 
course of the sample.
80
 
The apparent return of acquisition-related cases to Delaware may also 
be related to changes in the makeup of the plaintiffs’ bar. Corporate 
litigation in Delaware has long involved a complex interplay between 
local Delaware firms and out-of-state counsel who often have coordinated, 
nationwide practices. For many years, the law firm now known as 
Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess P.A. was thought to have a near-monopoly 
on filings by out-of-state counsel in Delaware.
81
 That firm appears to have 
lost this monopoly in the late 1990s and there are some open questions 
about what has happened since that time.
82
 The docket data help to answer 
those questions by providing information firms involved in these cases and 
how the makeup of the dominant firms may have been changing over time. 
One specific issue that the information in the docket helps to clarify is 
the connection between the presence of out-of-state counsel and the state 
of the Delaware docket. Delaware courts have long been generous in 
admitting out-of-state counsel to work in a given case.
83
 The usual process 
for doing so, the filing of a pro hac vice motion, almost always results in 
the motion being granted. The docket data contain information about these 
motions and, accordingly, the data can show the number of cases that 
involve out-of-state counsel.  
 
 
 78. See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3, at 1380. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See TCW Tech. Ltd. P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504 at 
*1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (“[T]he Court should give weight to the shareholder plaintiff that has the 
greatest economic stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.”). 
 81. Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 
supra note 21, at 463. 
 82. Id. at 480. 
 83. Id. at 485. 
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ABC speculate that out-of-state counsel could be one of the driving 
forces behind the apparent transition of cases outside of Delaware because 
these firms may find that their chances of bringing successful cases are 
greater in other venues.
84
 If cases did leave Delaware and—as some 
evidence developed here suggests—have made a return, one might expect 
this trend to be reflected in the level of involvement of outside counsel. 
Specifically, one would expect to see decreased involvement of outside 
counsel in the early part of the study, followed by an increase in the later 
periods, if in fact cases have returned to Delaware. And, indeed, the data 
show this pattern. 
The discussion in the previous section developed reasons why one 
might expect an increase in requests for expedited proceedings to appear 
in the data. As multi-jurisdictional litigation has increased, plaintiffs and 
their counsel may be making requests for expedited proceedings at a more 
rapid clip to try and seize control of litigation that is taking place across 
different courts. The docket data here allow for an identification of which 
cases have included some type of request for expedited proceedings. As 
the theory suggests, the general trend shows a substantial increase in the 
number of cases that involve requests to expedite. 
This section also codes each case for its eventual outcome. The focus 
of this information is, in large measure, on the presence of settlement 
hearings. These are the outcomes that plaintiffs’ attorneys desire in class 
action and derivative cases because they tend to produce the largest 
awards. The data on case outcomes also suggest that the battle over the 
designation of lead counsel has become a more contested matter because 
out-of-state counsel have been appearing earlier in cases than they have as 
a matter of historical practice. 
A. Trends in the Types of Cases Filed in Delaware 
For the cases in the sample, each complaint was coded for the type of 
case, including whether there were claims arising out of alleged breach of 
fiduciary duties, claims related to an acquisition, or contract claims. The 
complaints were also coded for whether they asserted class action or 
derivative claims. Figure 1 shows the proportion of unique cases (i.e. 
excluding cases that are based on the same underlying facts) by each case 
type. There is, naturally, some overlap among the categories of cases 
because some of these categories are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, with 
 
 
 84. See id. at 490. 
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some of the categories one usually implies the other. For example, 
acquisition cases are almost always filed as class action suits and 
derivative suits frequently involve fiduciary duty matters (as do 
acquisition-related class actions). 
FIGURE 1 
 
Figure 1 has a number of noteworthy features. The first is the degree of 
overlap of class actions and acquisition-related litigation. To a large 
extent, those two classes of cases are synonymous; there are very few class 
actions that do not involve challenges to acquisitions and there are very 
few acquisition-related cases that are not class actions. This is similar to 
the Thompson and Thomas finding in the 1999–2000 time period, and that 
trend appears to be very much intact.
85
 There is also an overlap between 
the fiduciary duty cases and the acquisition-related cases because most 
challenges to acquisitions include fiduciary duty claims. Similarly, 
derivative cases almost always involve fiduciary duty claims; thus, while 
almost all acquisition-related cases involve fiduciary duty claims, not all 
fiduciary duty cases are related to acquisitions.  
 
 
 85. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 6. 
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Another feature of the figure is the substantial increase in the 
proportion of cases that involve acquisitions over the course of the sample. 
In that time frame, the proportion of cases that involve acquisition-related 
claims more than doubled from around 25% to over 60%. Keep in mind 
that this proportion includes only unique cases (i.e., it does not count 
follow-up cases that might be filed based on the same set of facts). Were 
all complaints included, this proportion would be substantially higher. The 
sharp increase in the proportion of acquisition-related cases has naturally 
meant that the proportion of some other cases has fallen. Contract cases 
and derivative cases in the sample have seen a relative decline over the 
period, although it should be noted that derivative claims address 
acquisition-related matters with some frequency.
86
 Indeed, in 2004 the 
number of contract cases was higher than the number of acquisition-
related cases.
87
  
 
 
 86. The number of derivative cases has not fluctuated that much over the course of the sample. 
Previous scholarship has suggested that the number of derivative cases in Delaware declined in an 
earlier period due to the interaction of the PSLRA and Delaware’s rules that limit discovery in 
derivative proceedings. See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3, at 1377–78. ABC 
argue that the PSLRA caused cases that would otherwise have been filed as securities class-actions to 
be filed as derivative claims. Id. at 1379. Because Delaware generally does not permit discovery in 
derivative actions prior to a motion to dismiss—in contrast to some states that do permit this 
discovery—plaintiffs may be seeking out the more liberal discovery rules when they file these types of 
derivative cases outside of Delaware. Id. 
 87. The contract cases are not central to the analysis in this piece. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy 
that the Chancery hears a substantial number of these cases. This observation buttresses the impression 
that the Chancery’s equity-focused approach to contract interpretation enjoys some demand. See Adam 
B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the New Formalism, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 40–43 (2009) 
(explaining how Delaware’s contextually-oriented approach to contract interpretation may be 
attractive in some circumstances). 
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FIGURE 2 
 
Figure 2 provides the absolute numbers of each type of case in the 
sample. This figure shows the dramatic spike in acquisition-related cases 
even more vividly than Figure 1. From 2004 to 2007 the number of cases 
in each category remains relatively stable. After that period, the trend with 
respect to acquisition-related cases spikes dramatically, with the number 
increasing over threefold. The trends depicted in Figure 2 are consistent 
with those observed in other studies. While nationwide acquisition-related 
litigation involved roughly 100 cases per year in 2006 and 2007, only 
about a third of cases that could have been litigated in Delaware resulted 
in a Delaware case.
88
 In 2010 and 2011, the number of acqusition-related 
cases was 105 and 97 respectively.
89
 As Figure 2 indicates, many more of 
these cases resulted in a Delaware filing.
90
 
The use of unique cases in Figure 2 masks a different trend in the 
follow-up cases filed. When one accounts for the total number of cases, 
including first-filed and later-filed actions involving the same claims, the 
trend from 2010 to 2011 reverses with respect to acquisition-related cases, 
as Figure 3 shows. Rather than a decline year over year, there was an 
 
 
 88. See Cain & Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2011, supra note 2, at 2, 5. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 5 (note that these numbers are not exactly comparable because Cain and Davidoff 
impose a size threshold on the deals that they include in their dataset and because the data used in this 
Article are based on a sample rather than a census). 
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increase in the overall number of acquisition-related cases filed in 
Delaware. The reason for the difference, of course, is that the number of 
follow-up cases filed increased in 2011 on a per-case basis. Indeed, Figure 
3 shows that the number of follow-up cases has varied substantially over 
the course of the sample. From 2004 to 2009, the ratio of overall cases to 
unique cases remained relatively close to one, except for a substantial 
spike in 2005. That ratio increased in 2010 and continued doing so in 
2011. One suspects that this trend may show that some element of the race 
to the courthouse endures.
91
 
FIGURE 3 
 
B. Parties and Their Lawyers in the Court of Chancery 
The docket contains information about the identities of the parties in 
each case, their party type (e.g., plaintiff, defendant, etc.), the law firms 
that appeared in the case, and whether out-of-state counsel were admitted 
 
 
 91. See Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ 
Bar, supra note 21, at 482 (“The hasty filing habit persists in Delaware.”). Part of the explanation for 
why plaintiffs still file cases quickly after announcement may be related to the strategic dynamics 
associated with multi-forum litigation. If a non-Delaware case is proceeding quickly, plaintiffs’ 
counsel who are not involved in that matter may wish to file quickly in Delaware in order to move for 
expedited proceedings before the Chancery or in order to buttress any attempt to object to a settlement 
in the non-Delaware jurisdiction. 
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to appear for the purposes of the case. This section reviews the trends in 
the types of parties and the lawyers who represented them in the 2004 to 
2011 time period with an eye toward understanding the large recent spike 
in acquisition-related cases observed in the review of case types filed. 
Table 1 shows the yearly totals of identified public companies in 
unique cases and breaks down those cases by party status. The table 
reflects a slight decline in the total number of unique cases from 2004 to 
2007 before a substantial drop in 2008. This trend is consistent with the 
observation that acquisition-related cases are one of the most important 
parts of the Chancery Court docket and, during the period from roughly 
2004 to 2007, Delaware appears to have been losing these types of cases 
given that merger activity was substantial during that time period. The 
significant drop in 2008 tracks the observations by other studies showing a 
steep decline in acquisition-related cases filed that year. This decline is 
presumably related to the drop in the number of acquisitions during the 
financial crisis.
92
 The level of public-company litigation in the sample 
increased after this drop, reaching the highest total number of parties for 
any year in the sample in 2010. While the total numbers dipped in 2011, 
that year involved the second-highest number of public companies 
involved in litigation during the period of study. 
TABLE 1 
 Public Companies by Party Type in Delaware Cases 
 Defendant Plaintiff Other Total 
Year N % N % N % N 
2004 127 84.1 19 12.6 5 3.3 151 
2005 122 84.7 16 11.1 6 4.2 144 
2006 110 81.5 16 11.9 9 6.7 135 
2007 107 86.3 15 12.1 2 1.6 124 
2008 81 77.1 18 17.1 6 5.7 105 
2009 123 82.6 20 13.4 6 4.0 149 
2010 180 86.1 25 12.0 4 1.9 209 
2011 156 87.6 16 9.0 6 3.4 178 
Total 1006 84.2 145 12.1 44 3.7 1195 
 
 
 
 92. See Cain & Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2011, supra note 2, at 2 (showing that between 
2005 and 2011 the year that had the lowest number of deals that met their threshold and produced 
litigation was 2008, when only 50 such cases were filed). 
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As one might expect, public companies involved in Chancery Court 
litigation tend to be defendants. Even in the lowest percentage in the 
sample, about 77% in 2008, a strong majority of the public companies 
involved in litigation are defendants. That number reached as high as 
about 88% in 2011. The remainder of the categories involve lawsuits 
where public companies are plaintiffs—a number that ranges from a low 
of below 10% in 2011 to a high of just over 17% in 2008—and a handful 
of “other” statuses such as intervenor, interested party, and the like. 
As discussed in Part I, the role of institutional plaintiffs in corporate 
litigation is a matter of some interest. Delaware courts have borrowed 
loosely from the reforms to securities law in the process for selecting lead 
plaintiffs.
93
 Those reforms have emphasized the size of the shareholdings 
of parties to the case over other factors, such as which plaintiff was the 
first to file a complaint. One might expect that these changes would lead to 
a larger number of institutional shareholders appearing in Delaware cases 
because these shareholders tend to have larger holdings than other 
potential plaintiffs. 
Table 2 tracks the presence of institutional plaintiffs, many of which 
are pension funds, across the time period of the study. The table focuses 
only on acquisition-related cases and derivative cases because these are the 
cases where there is a significant chance that the selection of lead counsel 
will be contested. The data show that there has been a noticeable increase, 
beginning in 2007, in the percentage of these types of cases that have 
involved an institutional plaintiff. This jump from a percentage around 
20% to at least 30% perhaps provides some evidence that plaintiffs’ 
counsel have responded to the demands of the Chancery: that plaintiffs 
have larger shareholdings in order for their lawyers to be competitive in 
the selection of lead counsel. In terms of absolute numbers, the changes 
are even more stark. Between the years of 2004 and 2008, no year had 
more than thirty institutional plaintiffs involved in the cases in the sample, 
but from 2009 to 2011 that number has been in the low fifties.  
 
 
 93. Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3, at 1374. 
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TABLE 2 
Percentage of Acquisition & Merger-Related Cases  
involving Institutional Plaintiffs 
Year Total Institutional Plaintiff Present 
 N N % 
2004 73 15 20.5 
2005 137 25 18.2 
2006 67 11 16.4 
2007 94 29 30.9 
2008 56 17 30.4 
2009 94 51 54.3 
2010 170 51 30.0 
2011 189 52 27.5 
Total 1098 304 27.7 
A number of scholars have examined the role of the law firms most 
often involved in Chancery Court litigation.
94
 Much of this work has 
focused on the plaintiffs’ counsel that tend to bring cases. The following 
analysis provides information on all of the Delaware firms that appear and 
reveals the amount of concentration in the Delaware bar on both sides of 
public-company litigation. The docket does not, unfortunately, identify 
which law firm acts for which party, but it is possible to make some 
inferences based on previous work in the area. Table 3 shows the top ten 
law firms appearing in the cases for each of the years in the sample and the 
number of cases in which they appeared.
95
 
TABLE 3 
Firm Cases Firm Cases  
2011   2010   
Richards Layton & Finger 
P.A. 102 
Richards Layton & Finger 
P.A. 101 
 
 
 94. See, e.g., id.; David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical 
Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions (draft Sept. 
10, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1879647. 
 95. Delaware firms are listed in a routinized way in the docket, while the names of out-of-state 
firms that get admitted get entered as a line entry noting the granting of a pro hac vice motion. These 
line entries are not systematic in a way that allows for confident collection of the out-of-state firms that 
appear in a case. 
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Firm Cases Firm Cases  
Morris Nichols Arsht & 
Tunnell 89 
Morris Nichols Arsht & 
Tunnell 95 
Rosenthal Monhait & 
Goddess P.A. 83 
Rosenthal Monhait & 
Goddess P.A. 79 
Potter Anderson & 
Corroon LLP 71 Rigrodsky & Long P.A. 59 
Rigrodsky & Long P.A. 63 
Potter Anderson & Corroon 
LLP 58 
Faruqi & Faruqi LLP 54 Skadden Arps  45 
Young Conaway Stargatt 
& Taylor LLP 42 Cooch & Taylor P.A. 37 
Cooch & Taylor P.A. 38 Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. 30 
Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. 37 
Young Conaway Stargatt & 
Taylor LLP 27 
Labaton Sucharow LLP 33 Abrams & Bayliss LLP 26 
Total 612 Total 557 
2009 2008 
Morris Nichols Arsht & 
Tunnell 80 
Richards Layton & Finger 
P.A. 48 
Richards Layton & Finger 
P.A. 64 
Morris Nichols Arsht & 
Tunnell 41 
Rosenthal Monhait & 
Goddess P.A. 54 
Potter Anderson & Corroon 
LLP 25 
Rigrodsky & Long P.A. 43 
Rosenthal Monhait & 
Goddess P.A. 21 
Potter Anderson & 
Corroon LLP 30 Chimicles & Tikellis LLP 18 
Chimicles & Tikellis LLP 25 Skadden Arps 17 
Skadden Arps Slate 
Meagher & Flom LLP 22 Prickett Jones & Elliott 16 
Abrams & Bayliss LLP 17 
Young Conaway Stargatt & 
Taylor LLP 15 
Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. 16 Rigrodsky & Long P.A. 15 
Prickett Jones & Elliott 15 
Bouchard Margules & 
Friedlander P.A. 12 
Total 366 Total 228 
2007 2006 
Richards Layton & Finger 
P.A. 68 
Richards Layton & Finger 
P.A. 61 
Rosenthal Monhait & 
Goddess P.A. 56 
Rosenthal Monhait & 
Goddess P.A. 46 
Morris Nichols Arsht & 
Tunnell 52 
Morris Nichols Arsht & 
Tunnell 45 
Potter Anderson & 
Corroon LLP 38 
Potter Anderson & Corroon 
LLP 35 
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Firm Cases Firm Cases  
Abrams & Bayliss LLP 28 
Young Conaway Stargatt & 
Taylor LLP 23 
Rigrodsky & Long P.A. 27 Abrams & Bayliss LLP 21 
Skadden Arps  27 Ashby & Geddes 21 
Young Conaway Stargatt 
& Taylor LLP 24 Chimicles & Tikellis LLP 20 
Chimicles & Tikellis LLP 20 Prickett Jones & Elliott 18 
Prickett Jones & Elliott 12 Rigrodsky & Long P.A. 14 
Total 352 Total 304 
2005 2004 
Rosenthal Monhait & 
Goddess P.A. 124 
Rosenthal Monhait & 
Goddess P.A. 76 
Morris Nichols Arsht & 
Tunnell 75 
Richards Layton & Finger 
P.A. 68 
Richards Layton & Finger 
P.A. 59 
Morris Nichols Arsht & 
Tunnell 62 
Milberg Weiss Bershad & 
Schulman LLP 50 
Potter Anderson & Corroon 
LLP 39 
Potter Anderson & 
Corroon LLP 36 Prickett Jones & Elliott 25 
Skadden Arps  32 
Young Conaway Stargatt & 
Taylor LLP 18 
Chimicles & Tikellis LLP 28 Skadden Arps  15 
Young Conaway Stargatt 
& Taylor LLP 24 Chimicles & Tikellis LLP 14 
Prickett Jones & Elliott 24 Ashby & Geddes 13 
Biggs & Battaglia 24 Bayard Firm 10 
Total 476 Total 340 
 
Several trends emerge from this law firm data. Note that for all eight 
years of the study, the top three firms remain the same (except for 2008) 
with some jockeying as to their specific rank.
96
 Two of these firms, 
Richards, Layton & Finger P.A. and Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, 
generally represent defendants
97
 while Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess 
P.A. is a well-known plaintiffs’ firm.98 Commentators have discussed the 
 
 
 96. Note that several law firms have changed names over the course of the study. Each law firm 
is listed as it appeared most recently in the data. For example, the law firm of Abrams & Laster LLP 
changed names to Abrams & Bayliss LLP when Travis Laster was appointed as a Vice Chancellor. 
Every appearance of Abrams & Laster was counted as an appearance for Abrams & Bayliss. 
 97. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL (Sept. 15, 2012), http://www.martindale.com. 
 98. See Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ 
Bar, supra note 21, at 480–81. 
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concentration of the Delaware plaintiffs’ bar, but these data also show that 
the defense bar involves several players that dominate appearances in 
cases. The continued prominence of Rosenthal Monhait is also noteworthy 
because that firm was thought to have a near-monopoly on cases filed by 
out-of-state plaintiffs’ counsel during the late nineties.99 That monopoly 
may have been broken, but Rosenthal Monhait has still enjoyed the 
highest number of cases by a plaintiffs’ law firm in every single year of 
the study.
100
 
Other work has suggested that the other two leading plaintiffs’ law 
firms in Delaware are Chimicles & Tikellis and Rigrodsky Long.
101
 This 
account seems generally correct for the 2006 to 2009 time period but, 
beginning in 2010, Chimicles & Tikellis dropped off the list of top-ten law 
firms.
102
 In 2011, Faruqi & Faruqi was close on the heels of Rigrodsky 
Long for the position of second-most-active plaintiffs’ firm, a fact that 
suggests there has been some significant shift in the Delaware plaintiffs’ 
bar in recent years. Indeed, Faruqi & Faruqi may be emblematic of the 
return to Delaware; the firm first appears in the sample in 2010, with 
seven cases, and appears in fifty-four cases in 2011. 
At the same time, some prominent plaintiffs’ firms appear to be quite 
selective in bringing cases. Given that the Chancery’s perception of the 
quality of law firms is a factor in the selection of lead counsel,
103
 it is 
unsurprising that some firms may be fiercely protective of a reputation for 
filing a complaint only in cases with substantial merit. For example, 
Prickett, Jones & Elliott (“Prickett”) enjoys a strong reputation among 
Delaware plaintiffs’ firms.104 Prickett served as co-lead counsel in the 
Southern Peru Copper case, which produced an attorneys’ fee award of 
$300 million that the Delaware Supreme Court recently affirmed.
105
 
 
 
 99. Id. at 466. 
 100. Id. at 480. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Note that this dropoff may be an indication that the firm has become more selective in 
bringing cases—rather than, for example, a weakening of the connections the firm has with 
shareholders that may be able to act as potential plaintiffs. 
 103. See Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ 
Bar, supra note 21. 
 104. See, e.g., Abigail Caplovitz Field, The Legal Impact of Delaware Forum Selection, Corporate 
Secretary (June 11, 2012) (calling Prickett, Jones & Elliott a “venerable Delaware law firm”), 
available at http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/regulation-and-legal/12252/legal-impact-dela 
ware-forum-selection/. 
 105. See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1218 (Del. 2012) (affirming attorneys’ 
fee award and listing Prickett as co-lead counsel). 
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In awarding those fees, Chancellor Strine noted the quality of the 
counsel’s work and the difficulty of that case.106 It should be noted, 
however, that this case should not be considered standard fare for 
acquisition-related cases. The allegations involved self-dealing by a 
controlling shareholder and, accordingly, were subject to a more exacting 
legal standard than would apply to an acquisition approved by a board 
without a controlling shareholder.
107
 
The pattern of Prickett’s filings is consistent with a careful approach to 
the selection of cases. Throughout the sample, Prickett’s number of filed 
cases has varied between twelve and twenty-five cases. Indeed, the firm 
filed twenty-five cases in both 2004 and 2011, which suggests that the 
firm has not been part of the substantial expansion of filings in the last two 
years of the study.
108
  
Law firms appearing in the Chancery are often acting on behalf of out-
of-state counsel.
109
 In many cases, out-of-state counsel will appear in the 
case in order to argue motions, attend settlement hearings, and file papers. 
In order to do so, these out-of-state counsel must be admitted to practice 
for the purposes of the case through a pro hac vice motion. As discussed in 
Part I, Delaware grants these motions as a matter of course, and they are 
often unopposed. The docket contains an entry every time the court grants 
one of these motions, and each case has been coded for the presence of the 
term “pro hac vice.”110 Table 4 shows the annual percentage of cases 
 
 
 106. See id. at 1256 (quoting Chancellor Strine: “Did the plaintiffs have to do a lot of good work 
to get done and have to push back against a judge who was resistant to their approach? They did.”). 
 107.  The entire fairness standard requires a showing of fair dealing and fair price. Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). This standard applies where a controlling shareholder 
attempts a cashout merger of minority shareholders or, as in Southern Peru, a controlling shareholder 
proposes a merger with a company owned by the controlling shareholder. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. 
S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 763 (Del. Ch. 2011). This review is more exacting than the 
intermediate scrutiny applied to defensive measures that boards take in the context of takeovers. 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (intermediate scrutinty requires a 
board to show a threat to the corporation and a proportional response). 
 108. Not all plaintiffs’ firms with strong reputations have stayed within such a narrow band of 
complaints filed. Grant & Eisenhofer (“Grant”) enjoys an estimable reputation among Delaware firms, 
having been lead or co-lead counsel in cases such as Louisiana Municipal Employees’ Retirement 
System v. CBOT Holdings Inc., C.A. No. 2803-VCN (Del. Chan. 2007), and In re Tyson Foods Inc., 
C.A. No. 1106-CC (Del. Chan. Aug. 15, 2007). Prior to 2009, Grant filed less than ten cases a year. 
From 2009 to 2011, the respective number of cases filed has been sixteen, thirty, and thirty-seven. 
 109. See Armour et al., Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, supra note 21, at 463 (“Filings are 
often prepared primarily by out-of-state counsel, although Delaware counsel will normally review all 
filings to ensure they reflect Delaware procedures or customs.”). 
 110. The docket does not always code the granting of a pro hac vice motion in the same way so it 
was not feasible to code the actual grant of a motion rather than the presence of the term. Given that 
these motions are almost always granted there should be a very high overlap between the presence of 
the term and the granting of one of these motions. 
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where the docket contains that term across all the acquisition-related and 
derivative cases in the sample, the first-filed of such cases, and the later-
filed of these cases. Though unreported, the overall number of cases that 
involve pro hac vice motions mirrors quite closely the number of such 
motions in all acquisition-related and derivative cases in every year in the 
sample. 
TABLE 4 
Percentage of Acquisition-Related & Derivative Cases involving 
Pro Hac Vice Motions 
 All Such Cases First-Filed Cases Later-Filed Cases 
Year of 
Case 
Filing Total PHV Motion Total PHV Motion Total PHV Motion 
 N N % N N % N N % 
2004 73 35 47.9 49 32 65.3 24 3 12.5 
2005 137 42 30.7 61 40 65.6 76 2 2.6 
2006 67 34 50.7 49 31 63.3 18 3 16.7 
2007 94 56 59.6 60 42 70.0 34 14 41.2 
2008 56 33 58.9 43 30 69.8 13 3 23.1 
2009 94 61 64.9 64 49 76.6 30 12 40.0 
2010 170 98 57.6 113 86 76.1 57 12 21.1 
2011 189 117 61.9 97 69 71.1 92 48 52.2 
Total 880 476 54.1 536 379 70.7 344 97 28.2 
 
One of the starkest patterns in Table 4 is the shift in the number of pro 
hac vice motions filed in later-filed cases, with an especially large spike in 
2011. In order to understand what the data may show, it is helpful to 
discuss two points. First, cases often get consolidated into the first-filed 
case number even if the counsel to be selected as lead did not file it.
111
 
Second, it is almost certainly the case that calling in the aid of outside 
counsel will only be worth the time and expense to do so when a 
potentially-contested matter arises.
112
 These two factors combine to 
 
 
 111. Interview with Delaware attorney on file with author. 
 112. While both plaintiffs and defendants make use of counsel that have been admitted pro hac 
vice, defense counsel will almost always wait until consolidation occurs to do so. The reason for this 
practice is that otherwise they must pay the pro hac vice fee for every case in which they bring this 
type of motion. By waiting for consolidation, defense counsel only need to pay the fee once for every 
admitted lawyer. Id. 
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suggest that the selection of lead counsel has become more contested in 
the later part of the sample. 
If plaintiffs’ counsel agree to appoint lead counsel, consolidating the 
other cases case will be a formality that is unlikely to need the admission 
and support of the out-of-state counsel who may be directing the case. But 
if plaintiffs’ counsel cannot agree on who will be the lead, a contested 
motion to consolidate is where this battle will likely play out. These 
proceedings are likely to include the presence of out-of-state counsel 
because, if that battle is lost, those counsel are unlikely to receive any fee 
award. The outcome data discussed below provide further support for this 
suggestion; consolidated cases are, indeed, more likely to involve pro hac 
vice motions. 
There is also an upward trend in the presence pro hac vice motions 
across all cases. This pattern is consistent with suggestions that out-of-
state counsel preferred to file elsewhere in the early part of the sample 
followed by a stronger preference for Delaware as a forum in the later part 
of the sample. The low point of out-of-state counsel involvement is cases 
filed in 2005, when only about 31% of cases had the presence of a pro hac 
vice motion. Recall from Figure 3 that 2005 involved a relatively high 
number of follow-up cases, a pattern that would not return until 2009. But, 
unlike the later period in the sample, 2005-filed cases did not include 
much involvement from out-of-state counsel. This observation suggests 
that in 2005, plaintiffs were able to agree on lead counsel and did not have 
to contest consolidation motions. Note from Table 3 that Rosenthal 
Monhait filed more cases in that year than any other firm at any point in 
the sample. This data point corroborates the potential for a lack of lead 
counsel battles given that firm’s traditional role as referee for out-of-state 
counsel. 
C. Case Outcomes 
The amount of value that plaintiffs and their lawyers see in a case 
likely depends on the value attached with the case’s expected outcome. 
While the docket does not include exhaustive and systematic information 
on how much each case produces in awards and attorneys’ fees, it does 
provide information on how cases get resolved. As with most other 
American jurisdictions, a majority of the acquistion-related and derivative 
cases in Delaware end through voluntary actions that are usually part of a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/10
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settlement.
113
 These agreed-upon outcomes take various shapes in the 
Court of Chancery.
114
 The parties can reach an agreement that entails 
filing a voluntary or stipulated dismissal with the court. This outcome may 
occur when plaintiffs realize that a case is not worth pursuing, perhaps due 
to the loss of an early motion such as one for expedited discovery. 
Alternatively, dismissals of this sort can occur when plaintiffs’ attorneys 
have made arrangements to proceed in another jurisdiction.
115
  
Consolidation is another possible outcome in the Chancery Court. 
These consolidations can be either contested or uncontested. When 
plaintiffs’ lawyers are able to agree on lead counsel, the resulting 
uncontested consolidation is a relatively simple process in which attorneys 
enter a request to combine cases that the court will almost always 
approve.
116
 A contested consolidation takes place when plaintiffs’ 
attorneys cannot agree on who will serve as lead counsel—the court must 
then decide who will play that role.
117
 If derivative or class action lawsuits 
result in a settlement that will terminate the case and require an award of 
attorneys’ fees, that agreement must be approved by the court in a 
settlement hearing, which is another potential outcome in these cases.
118
  
Table 5, below, shows the trends in outcomes for all acquisition-related 
and derivative cases. The table focuses on these cases because the trends 
here are not that different from the overall trends and there is little of 
interest that comes from focusing on the outcomes of cases that do not fall 
into these categories. There are two details about the table that are worth 
noting. First, sometimes consolidation orders occur in the case that will 
become the lead case in a derivative or class action (the order 
consolidating all other cases into that lead case). These cases have not 
been coded as consolidated because that is not the ultimate outcome of the 
case; these cases will typically go on to result in settlement hearings or 
voluntary dismissals. Second, the “other” field captures a number of quite 
 
 
 113. On general settlement trends, see Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial 
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339–40 (1994) (noting that 
estimations of the settlement rate of cases in the United States range from two-thirds to between 85 
and 95 percent). 
 114. Interview with Delaware lawyer on file with author. 
 115. Note that Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23(e) only allows the dismissal of a class action 
without notice to the class if there has been a showing that no compensation has been paid by the 
defendant to the plaintiff or the plaintiffs’ attorney. A deal among plaintiffs’ attorneys to cut a 
Delaware filer into the leadership structure in another state is unlikely to trigger any concern because it 
does not involve the payment of compensation from the defendant to the plaintiffs’ attorney seeking 
dismissal. See DEL. CT. CH. R. 23(e). 
 116. Interview with Delaware lawyer on file with author. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. 
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different categories. In some small number of these instances, the 
Chancery will make a ruling dismissing a case and that ends the matter 
(more often an opinion or order will result in a subsequent voluntary 
dismissal or settlement). In other cases, the matter is still ongoing or has 
been transferred to another court. 
TABLE 5 
Outcomes of Acquisition-Related and Derivative Cases 
Filing 
Year 
Consolidated 
Voluntary 
Dismissal 
Settlement 
Hearing 
Other Total 
 N 
% of 
Cases 
N 
% of 
Unconsol. 
Cases 
N 
% of 
Unconsol. 
Cases 
N 
% of 
Unconsol. 
Cases 
 
2004 21 28.8% 12 23.1% 23 44.2% 17 32.7% 73 
2005 66 48.2% 22 31.0% 23 32.4% 26 36.6% 137 
2006 17 25.4% 21 42.0% 17 34.0% 12 24.0% 67 
2007 28 29.8% 34 51.5% 19 28.8% 13 19.7% 94 
2008 12 21.4% 20 45.5% 11 25.0% 13 29.5% 56 
2009 30 31.9% 30 46.9% 27 42.2% 7 10.9% 94 
2010 65 38.2% 48 45.7% 33 31.4% 24 22.9% 170 
2011 89 47.1% 35 35.0% 28 28.0% 37 37.0% 189 
 
A number of trends emerge from the table. Consolidations have been 
especially high in the last two years of the study, as they were in 2005. 
This pattern likely reflects the large number of follow-up cases filed in 
those years. If a case is not unique, they are often combined into one case 
that designates lead or co-lead plaintiffs and counsel either through an 
agreement of the plaintiffs’ attorneys or a decision of the court. There has 
been a general increase in the number of unconsolidated cases that have 
resulted in voluntary dismissals. The percentage of unconsolidated cases 
that ended this way dropped in 2011, but this may be a reflection of the 
fact that some of these cases are still ongoing and have been classified as 
“other.” Insofar as cases appear likely to be dismissed through agreement, 
this trend may be related to the documented trend of multiple cases being 
filed in multiple jurisdictions. If the plaintiffs’ counsel involved in 
multiple jurisdictions can strike a deal that includes an agreement to 
proceed outside of Delaware, they can be expected to voluntarily dismiss 
the Delaware action rather than pursue it all the way to a settlement 
hearing. 
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Given the interest in the role of out-of-state counsel, it is worth looking 
at the outcomes in those specific instances. Table 6 provides these details, 
and three trends are worth discussing. First, pro hac vice motions have 
become more common in consolidated cases in the last two years than at 
any other time in the sample. This pattern provides some evidence that the 
consolidation of cases has become a more combative matter because it 
would probably not be a worthwhile endeavor to engage out-of-state 
counsel to file an uncontested motion to consolidate.
119
  
Second, the trends with respect to the involvement of out-of-state 
counsel do not appear to be as dramatic in cases that result in settlement 
hearings.
120
 Indeed, in every year of the sample, almost all of the cases 
with settlement hearings involved cases with pro hac vice motions. It is 
difficult to know what this information means, however, because it is not 
possible to tell from the docket whether the out-of-state counsel were 
involved in the filing of these cases. It may be that the out-of-state counsel 
directed the case from the very beginning, or that they were recruited once 
it became clear that the case would be a significant one. 
Finally, the number of cases that result in voluntary dismissals has also 
seen an increase in the involvement of out-of-state counsel. This trend 
suggests that out-of-state-counsel are litigating these sorts of cases with 
more vigor. This increased effort may be symptomatic of increased multi-
jurisdictional litigation; plaintiffs’ attorneys may be pressing to get results 
more quickly so that they can settle with defendants before other groups of 
plaintiffs are able to do so. Of course, these efforts may not work out—for 
example, a motion for expedited discovery may be denied—in which case, 
a voluntary dismissal may occur. 
 
 
 119. See, e.g., Transcript of Teleconference Motion to Consolidate Feb. 15, 2012 Teleconference, 
Volpe v. Hale, C.A. No. 7201-VCP (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2012) (in commenting on a contested 
consolidation Vice Chancellor Parsons explained “I am distressed by the fact that now we have four 
sets of lead counsel and no cooperation between the two major sides. This is my least favorite aspect 
of this job, getting involved in these types of disputes. I really rely strongly on counsel to get them 
resolved. When they don't get it resolved, we end up with results like this.”). 
 120. It looks like there is a decline in 2008, but recall from Table 5 that only eleven settlement 
hearings occurred in the sample and eight of them involved a pro hac vice motion. 
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TABLE 6 
Outcomes of Acquisition-Related and Derivative Cases involving 
Pro Hac Vice (PHV) Motions 
  
Consolidated Voluntary Dismissal Settlement Hearing Other 
N % N % N % N % 
2004 2 5.7% 4 11.4% 21 60.0% 8 22.9% 
2005 1 2.4% 9 21.4% 22 52.4% 10 23.8% 
2006 2 5.9% 8 23.5% 16 47.1% 8 23.5% 
2007 13 23.2% 19 33.9% 16 28.6% 8 14.3% 
2008 3 9.1% 13 39.4% 8 24.2% 9 27.3% 
2009 12 19.7% 19 31.1% 24 39.3% 6 9.8% 
2010 21 21.4% 24 24.5% 31 31.6% 22 22.4% 
2011 49 41.9% 20 17.1% 25 21.4% 23 19.7% 
 
A final pattern to note is the trend with respect to requests for 
expedited proceedings. As discussed above, winning a motion to fast track 
proceedings can be advantageous if parallel litigation is proceeding across 
multiple jurisdictions. A successful motion for expedited proceedings is 
likely to get the attention of defense counsel quickly in merger cases 
because the need to respond rapidly to discovery requests can threaten a 
deal. Insofar as multi-forum litigation has expanded over the course of the 
sample, one should expect an increase in the number of requests to 
expedite. As Table 7 shows, there has been a general increase in this trend. 
The percentage of all merger and derivative cases that involve a request to 
expedite increased from about a quarter in the early part of the sample to 
more than half in 2011. When one restricts the analysis to those cases that 
involve a pro hac vice motion, and hence are likely driven by out-of-state 
counsel, the numbers are even more dramatic. The increase is from 
roughly a third of cases in 2004 to over seventy percent in 2011. These 
trends provide more evidence that out-of-state counsel may be driving the 
back-to-Delaware pattern and that they may be doing so because a 
favorable ruling in Delaware may allow them to gain leverage in litigation 
that is going on elsewhere. 
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TABLE 7 
Percentage of Acquisition-Related and Derivative Cases 
Involving Requests for Expedited Proceedings 
Filing Year Expedite Request 
Expedite Request in Cases  
with a PHV motion 
 N % N % 
2004 20 27.4% 11 31.4% 
2005 41 29.9% 20 47.6% 
2006 18 26.9% 17 50.0% 
2007 37 39.4% 32 57.1% 
2008 22 39.3% 18 54.5% 
2009 44 46.8% 38 62.3% 
2010 65 38.2% 59 60.2% 
2011 98 51.9% 83 70.9% 
 
III. ACCOUNTING FOR THE APPARENT RETURN OF CASES TO DELAWARE 
Perhaps the most pressing question raised by this study and related 
research is why the acquisition-related cases appear to have left Delaware 
for a time, followed by an apparent return. This Part uses the data from 
Part II to explore what may explain this recent return. A natural place to 
start looking for an explanation is in the existing theories from the ABC 
papers and the Cain and Davidoff studies discussed in Part I. This Part 
explores these accounts and discusses how they appear to fit the data. This 
Part then offers some new theories to see how they complement both the 
existing approaches and information developed in this study and concludes 
with thoughts on the apparent persistence of the importance of being first 
to file. 
Available data from 2005 through 2007 show a rather sharp increase in 
acquisition-related cases on a nationwide level that coincided with an 
increase in dealmaking at the time.
121
 The number of acquisition-related 
cases in Delaware was more-or-less flat during that time period. This 
observation is consistent with ABC’s findings that Delaware had been 
falling out of favor with plaintiffs’ for some time.122 The dataset in this 
study cannot provide much insight to two of ABC’s theories, namely that 
criticism from the Chancery and the threat of fee cuts led plaintiffs’ 
 
 
 121. Cain & Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2011, supra note 2, at 2. 
 122. See infra notes 25–31. 
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lawyers to file in other jurisdictions.
123
 The docket data simply do not 
provide much information along these lines.  
But the dataset does allow exploration into two of ABC’s other 
theories—that the party that files first has been deprioritized in selecting 
lead counsel
124
 and that fragmentation of the plaintiffs’ bar has led to more 
cases outside of Delaware.
125
 ABC show how the Chancery has altered the 
test for awarding lead counsel status by moving from a process that 
deferred to the deals struck by plaintiffs’ attorneys to one that emphasizes 
the quality of the pleading, the attorney’s skill, and the presence of 
institutional clients.
126
 It is, of course, not possible to measure the effect of 
these factors on cases that were not filed in Delaware. Those lawyers who 
thought they might fare poorly under this new standard may have moved 
on to jurisdictions where their ability to get to the courthouse quickly was 
more likely to produce lead counsel status.
127
 And, indeed, the number of 
institutional plaintiffs has increased over time in the sample. If these 
institutional plaintiffs actually do draw higher quality counsel, this could 
be a desirable result for the Chancery. As David Webber shows, 
institutional clients were often designated as lead plaintiffs in the period 
from 2004 to 2009.
128
  
But the number of acquisition-related class actions in Delaware grew 
substantially in 2010 and 2011. What could account for this change? This 
increase does not appear to be driven by institutional plaintiffs, as their 
relative numbers declined during this time. There has been, however, 
substantial growth in the number of follow-up filings. It is possible that 
this change has a relationship with the recent increase in multi-
jurisdictional litigation in acquisition-class actions.
129
 Cain and Davidoff 
 
 
 123. Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3, at 1370–80. 
 124. Id. at 1370–76. 
 125. See Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ 
Bar, supra note 21. 
 126. Id. at 482–83. 
 127. Id. at 483–84. 
 128. See Webber, supra note 94. 
 129. ABC have attributed some of the move away from Delaware as a response to Delaware’s 
shift to merit-based selection of lead counsel and the threat to trim attorneys’ fees. Armour et al., 
Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 3, at 1380. Some members of the Chancery have expressed 
similar theories. In Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Vice Chancellor Laster commented that 
“[i]t’s also well-known that Delaware courts have responded to the filing of poorer-quality suits by 
cutting fees and criticizing the . . . rapid filing, of these poor-quality, nonmeritorious suits. It’s not 
surprising that plaintiff’s lawyers . . . rationally responded to that by increasing the frequency with 
which they file elsewhere.” Micheletti & Parker, supra note 13, at 13 (quoting Transcript of 
Courtroom Status Conference at 18–19, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 
5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010)). 
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show that, for deals that meet their threshold, the percentage involving 
litigation in more than one jurisdiction has increased from 8.6% in 2005 to 
47.4% in 2011.
130
  
As one Delaware lawyer explained in an interview, if out-of-state 
counsel lose the race to the courthouse in a foreign jurisdiction that 
follows the first-to-file rule—which means they have little chance of being 
named lead counsel
131—there may still be value in filing in Delaware. This 
is especially true for counsel with strong reputations. These lawyers can 
file in Delaware, where speed is less important for the selection of lead 
counsel,
132
 and they can credibly threaten to move forward in Delaware 
because their reputations give them a possibility of being named lead 
counsel.
133
 They can either use this threat to demand that the counsel in the 
foreign jurisdiction let them into the leadership structure in that forum—in 
exchange for dismissing the Delaware case—or they can simply move 
forward in Delaware. Indeed, this scenario may be a contributing factor to 
the observed increase in voluntary dismissals over the course of the 
sample. 
 
 
 130. Cain & Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2011, supra note 2, at 2. 
 131. John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases? supra note 3, at 42 (noting that “[o]ur 
interviewees told us that the first-to-file custom remains important elsewhere”); Mark Lebovitch et al., 
Making Order Out of Chaos: A Proposal To Improve Organization and Coordination in Multi-
Jurisdictional Merger-Related Litigation 4, BERNSTEIN, LITOWITZ, BERGER AND GROSSMAN LLP 
(Sept. 15, 2012), available at http://www.blbglaw.com/misc_files/MakingOrderoutofChaos (stating 
that “[d]espite what we believe is a close link between the identity of lead counsel and the quality of 
case outcome for shareholders, many jurisdictions still determine lead plaintiff and lead counsel 
through a rule of absolute priority.”). But see Griffith & Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger 
Litigation, supra note 16, at 34 (arguing that “While some jurisdictions may follow the traditional 
first-to-file rule for awarding leadership roles, the law in most jurisdictions seems to be that 
appointment of lead counsel is at the discretion of the court if counsel cannot agree.”). 
 132. Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 
supra note 21, at 479–84. 
 133. It helps matters that these out-of-state counsel do not file in a foreign jurisdiction because the 
Chancery frowns on the practice of firms filing in multiple jurisdictions and doing so may weigh 
against a firm’s selection as lead counsel. Micheletti & Parker, supra note 13, at 11–12 n.37 (noting 
that in In re BJ Services Co. Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No. 4851-VCN (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 2009), 
the court awarded lead counsel to a party that filed exclusively in Delaware over one that filed 
identical lawsuits in Delaware as well as a non-Delaware jurisdiction); id. at 26 n.109, (citing Alison 
Frankel, Strine to M&A Bar: Don't Stop Believing . . . in Delaware, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & 
INSIGHT (Nov. 14, 2011), available at http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/ 
11_-_November/Strine_to_M_A_bar__Don_t_stop_believing_____in_Delaware/) (quoting Chancellor 
Strine’s comment that “lawyers who file cases that will turn on Delaware law in other jurisdictions . . . 
are engaged in ‘forum shopping of the rankest kind,’ because they know Delaware won’t ‘junk up’ its 
corporate laws to compete with [other states]”) (alterations in original); id. at 39 (concluding that 
“[p]erhaps as more non-Delaware judges understand the tactics that compel counsel to file multi-
jurisdictional deal litigation, the less likely it will be for Delaware deal litigations filed in non-
Delaware forums to gain traction.”). 
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The lack of a clear standard to determine what will happen when 
litigation proceeds in multiple jurisdictions may facilitate the strategy of 
filing in Delaware. As mentioned in Part I, former-Chancellor Chandler 
expressed a desire that defense counsel move to have the judges in 
different jurisdictions confer and come to a resolution.
134
 The present 
Chancellor, Leo Strine, Jr., does not seem to be as favorably inclined to 
this approach. As a Vice Chancellor he expressed his belief that, at least in 
expedited proceedings, when “there is a choice between two forums, the 
forum whose law is at stake ought to go forth” and that those jurisdictions 
without this interest can “stay in [their] own lane.”135  
Some have suggested that the desire to protect Delaware’s say over 
cases that implicate its law has contributed to the evolving application of 
the McWane doctrine, which determines whether the court will stay a case 
in Delaware in favor of litigation elsewhere.
136
 As articulated, this doctrine 
favors the grant of a stay in cases that are second-filed in Delaware. The 
Chancery appears, however, to have found a number of reasons that 
warrant not granting such a stay. Many of these justifications focus on the 
importance of Delaware hearing potentially meaningful corporate law 
cases.
137
 As one commentator has explained: “In almost all the recent, 
 
 
 134. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 135. Micheletti & Parker, supra note 13, at 30 (citing Transcript of Hearing on Motion to 
Expedite, at 17, In re RAE Sys., Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 5848-VCS (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2010)). 
 136. The McWane doctrine was introduced in 1970 and thus forms part of a legal framework that 
developed long before the advent of multi-jurisdictional litigation and the related problems it has 
caused the Delaware courts. See McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng’g Co., 263 
A.2d 281, 283 (Del. 1970). The doctrine in its original configuration simply required that second-filed 
equitable claims in Delaware be stayed in favor of equivalent first-filed claims in front of competent 
tribunals. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in 
Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 107 (2009).  
 137. The Chancery Court has rejected the importance of filing first by finding, on several 
occasions, that second-filed Delaware lawsuits were “effectively contemporaneously filed.” 
Stevelman, supra note 136, at 109 (emphasis in original). The court has found Delaware suits to be 
effectively contemporaneously filed in several cases, including a case in which the Delaware claim 
was not filed until 3 weeks after the original lawsuit. Id. (citing Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. 
Ch. 2007)). In the same vein, the court has relegated the impact and scope of the McWane doctrine. 
See CA, Inc. v. Ingres Corp., C.A. No. 4300-VCS, 2009 WL 4575009 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 2009) (holding 
that a Forum Selection Clause choosing Delaware should control even if application of the McWane 
doctrine would lead to a different result). The court has also indicated that it will not stay second-filed 
Delaware cases in favor of first-filed lawsuits in foreign jurisdictions where it perceives that the 
plaintiff’s lawyers have attempted to expedite proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction for the purpose of 
securing lead counsel status rather than representing the class of plaintiffs as effectively as possible. In 
Dias v. Purches, where the foreign plaintiff’s lawyers had filed motions for expedited discovery and an 
expedited hearing, the court responded by holding that these measures were not “so extensive as to 
require a stay” and that “[d]iscounting, as I find appropriate, the (barely) first-filed nature of the 
Florida Action, I find nothing that indicates that this matter should be stayed in deference to the 
Florida Action.” C.A. No. 7199-VCG, 2012 WL 689160 at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 2012). One 
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salient cases (M&A and fiduciary loyalty breach cases involving Delaware 
public companies), the court has deployed its new standards to keep forum 
and proceed with the litigation.”138 This uncertainty about how courts will 
resolve disputes over where to proceed gives a party’s threat to go forward 
in Delaware even more weight because there is some possibility, and 
perhaps a strong possibility, that the Chancery will refuse to stay actions 
that have been filed first elsewhere. 
But even for those plaintiffs’ counsel who do not have a plausible 
claim to being named lead counsel in Delaware, a Delaware filing can still 
provide some hope for a share of the fees. If these out-of-state plaintiffs’ 
counsel have lost the race to the courthouse in a first-to-file jursidiction, 
they have nothing to gain by filing second there. If they file in Delaware, 
even if they are not first, these out-of-state lawyers can threaten to fight a 
consolidation motion against those who have filed in Delaware and are 
likely to be named lead counsel. Delaware’s use of a standard-like 
framework for the selection of lead counsel means that this threat is not 
entirely trivial. If counsel cannot agree on who will be lead counsel and 
leave lead counsel selection to the court, the process is likely to require 
more time and expense than it would if Delaware follwed a 
straightforward first-to-file rule. Counsel who are likely to win a contested 
lead counsel motion may prefer to offer a small share of any potential 
settlement in exchange for an agreement not to contest a dismissal. This 
pattern would help to explain the increase in Delaware follow-up cases 
and it is consistent with anecdotal accounts from Delaware counsel of how 
multi-jurisdictional cases sometimes proceed. 
The full picture of incentives driving the filing of strategic follow-up 
complaints emerges only when considering their use in the context of 
multi-jurisdictional litigation: not only can counsel use the filing to impose 
a tax on those who would act as lead counsel in Delaware, but they can 
also use the Delaware filing for leverage in a foreign jurisdiction. The 
Chancery has noted this specific trend. As Chancellor Strine explained 
when a plaintiff objected to the dismissal of a Delaware action: “To be 
 
 
commentator has noted that these actions may simply reflect the Court’s belief that cases involving the 
internal affairs of companies incorporated in Delaware belong in Delaware. See Stevelman, supra note 
136, at 119 (concluding that based on the principles of the Internal Affairs Doctrine and basic 
efficiency, “[i]n 2007, in its Topps decision, the Court of Chancery makes something of a universal 
claim of right to keep forum over Delaware corporate lawsuits in parallel proceedings.”). The same 
commentator observed that “[a]s other courts become more aware of Delaware’s new, more aggressive 
approach to resolving (and keeping) forum in parallel proceedings, there are likely to be more 
‘standoffs’ between Delaware and other jurisdictions.” Id. at 110. 
 138. Id. at 108. 
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candid, the plaintiff’s objection to dismissal actually proves why dismissal 
is required. Plaintiffs are not entitled to file placeholder actions, choose 
not to prosecute them at all, and to keep them on file because that gives 
them some leverage in litigation elsewhere.”139 The Chancery will, of 
course, not always be able to detect and police this kind of behavior 
because, at least in that case, it took a dispute over dismissal to bring 
attention to the tactic. In cases without these sorts of disputes, counsel may 
be able to file a placeholder complaint and use it as leverage for litigation 
occurring elsewhere.
140
 As discussed earlier, plaintiffs can point to a 
Delaware filing as a reason for objecting to a settlement reached in a 
different state by a different group of lawyers.
141
 
ABC’s second theory suggests that other states have made it easier for 
out-of-state lawyers to be admitted through pro hac vice motions.
142
 
Insofar as the previous difficulty of this process deterred cases, these 
lawyers are more likely to file cases in these other jurisdictions.
143
 The 
dataset in this Article can provide some insight to this potential trend 
through measuring the presence of pro hac vice motions, although the 
 
 
 139. Micheletti & Parker, supra note 13, at 21 n.78, (quoting In re Dynegy Inc. S’holders Litig., 
C.A. No. 5739-VCS, at 2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2011)). 
 140. Note that this process can also work the other way. Counsel can leverage the threat of 
proceeding in an alternative jurisdiction as a way to get a cut of a fee in exchange for dismissing that 
case and allowing the Delaware action to proceed. Mark Lebovitch has explained that this often 
happens when Delaware plaintiffs are close to reaching a favorable settlement which is conditioned on 
its acceptance by all other plaintiffs in the other jurisdictions, “including those who simply filed an 
action and then stipulated to a stay of their case[]. Sensing leverage, the plaintiffs in the alternate and 
stayed forum refuse to join the settlement unless they are paid a significant ‘tax’ disproportionate to 
any efforts or actual contributions toward the outcome of the case.” Mark Lebovitch et al., Improving 
Multi-Jurisdictional, Merger-Related Litigation (May 19, 2011), available at http://blogs.law.harvard 
.edu/corpgov/2011/05/19/improving-multi-jurisdictional-merger-related-litigation/. Because Delaware 
plaintiff’s lawyers “are barred by Delaware practice from negotiating a fee with defendants, [they] are 
forced to give significant credit for achieving the shareholder-benefits in the settlement with third 
parties who did little or nothing.” Id. 
 141. An example of this practice, without any comment on whether the underlying objection had 
merit, occurred in the parallel litigation that contested Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch. 
Separate groups of plaintiffs filed parallel derivative actions in the Court of Chancery and in the 
Southern District of New York. On April 12, 2012, Bank of America and the New York plaintiffs filed 
a Memorandum of Understanding in the New York courts that purported to be a global release of all 
derivative claims. The Delaware plaintiffs moved to enjoin the settlement proceedings and, after that 
motion was denied (see In Re Bank of America Corporation Stockholder Derivative Litigation, Del. 
Ct. Chan. 4307-CS (May 4, 2012)), the Delaware plaintiffs have attempted to contest the settlement in 
New York. Those attempts have thus far been unsuccessful, but the court has yet to approve the 
settlement. See In re Bank of Am. Sec., Derivative, and ERISA Litig., 1:09-md-02058-PKC (S.D.N.Y. 
May 14, 2012) (denying Delaware plaintiffs motion to intervene). 
 142. See Armour et al., Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, supra note 21, at 488–89 (describing 
the current ease with which lawyers can get pro hac vice motions approved in most states). 
 143. Id. at 485–88 (describing the earlier difficulty of getting pro hac vice motions in states other 
than Delaware). 
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coverage of the dataset does not cover the entire time period that ABC 
analyze. Their data suggests that this trend began around 2000, which is 
before the first year of this study.
144
 Nevertheless, the years that involve 
the lowest percentage of cases with pro hac vice motions are in the earliest 
year of the study, when other information corroborates that Delaware was 
losing cases in a relative sense.
145
 
The presence of pro hac vice motions rises in the later years of the 
study. Given the sharp increase in the number of acquisition-related cases, 
this pattern is consistent with the possibility that out-of-state counsel have 
played a role in the return of these cases to Delaware. But the pronounced 
increase in the numbers of pro hac vice motions in cases that get 
consolidated suggests that plaintiffs’ lawyers may be finding it more 
difficult to agree on who will serve as lead counsel. Imagine, for example, 
a situation where two out-of-state law firms direct a complaint to be filed 
in Delaware and it is clear that one of the firms would be named lead 
counsel due to its sterling reputation. The two firms can strike a deal 
where the strong firm offers a small slice of any settlement to the other 
firm in exchange for that firm’s agreement not to contest consolidation. A 
pro hac vice motion is unlikely to be needed for the consolidation motion 
in this situation because nothing is disputed. But if ten out-of-state firms 
file complaints, this sort of negotiation may become much more difficult 
because it becomes more likely that one of the firms will hold out. In this 
situation, one might expect more contested consolidations and, given the 
high stakes, it makes sense to go through the expense of bringing in out-
of-state counsel through a pro hac vice motion to argue the consolidation 
proceeding.  
The pattern of increasingly contested consolidation motions may be 
consistent with the increasing fragmentation of the plaintiffs’ bar. One 
potential account is that this fragmentation contributed to the decision to 
file outside of Delaware. But as time went on and the competition among 
the plaintiffs’ bar increased, the benefits of filing outside of Delaware 
diminished, this being especially true if a firm were not the first to file in a 
foreign jurisdiction. Competition may have driven firms to return to 
Delaware because the possibility of getting some portion of an attorneys’ 
fee award there or of gaining leverage in foreign jurisdictions is higher. 
Insofar as the competition is still increasing, this phenomenon suggests 
that caseloads in Delaware may continue to grow, especially with respect 
 
 
 144. Id. at 488–89. 
 145. See Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Cases?, supra note 3. 
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to the number of follow-up cases filed. Delaware courts can only do so 
much to affect this competition and, consequently, this increasing growth 
may be contributing to the Chancery’s loss of some control over Delaware 
filings. 
Even in advance of consolidation, a Delaware complaint can provide 
some strategic leverage to the lawyers who file it. Indeed, some attempts 
to expedite often happen in advance of, or sometimes simultaneously with, 
a motion to consolidate.
146
 The ability of a plaintiff to move for a motion 
to expedite even before being named lead counsel may provide some 
explanation for why the race to the courthouse persists in Delaware. If 
litigation has already started in another jurisdiction, a Delaware filing 
followed shortly by a motion to expedite provides some chance of 
catching the attention of the defense counsel who are handling the multiple 
fronts of litigation. The increase in the requests to expedite observed in the 
docket data provide reason to believe that plaintiffs’ counsel are making 
use of this tactic. The fact that a growing number of these cases involve 
out-of-state counsel is further evidence that Delaware may be an 
increasingly attractive option for those lawyers that have lost the race to 
the courthouse elsewhere. It can be burdensome and expensive for out of 
state lawyers to go to the trouble and cost of filing a pro hac vice motion 
and arguing a motion in the Court of Chancery. The evidence that out-of-
state counsel appear to be taking these steps at an increasing clip suggests 
that they must perceive some expected benefit from doing so. 
Cain and Davidoff premise their account of competition between states 
for acquisition-related cases on the theory that plaintiffs seek the highest 
expected rewards.
147
 They measure these expected rewards through 
settlement rates and attorneys’ fees, both of which are likely to be 
prominent in the minds of lawyers when they decide where to file.
148
 But 
other factors may be driving the decision where to file. As explored above, 
it may be the case that lawyers file in Delaware not due to a higher 
expected reward in Delaware, but because that filing can give them 
leverage in other jurisdictions. This effect could deflate Delaware 
 
 
 146. For example, in Pontiac General Employees Retirement System v. Kevin Brine, C.A. No. 
7144-VCG (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2011), the plaintiffs filed a complaint on December 22, 2011 and moved 
to expedite proceedings on December 27, 2012. The following day the plaintiffs moved for 
consolidation and appointment of lead counsel status. Likewise in Lehigh County Employees 
Retirement Plan v. Illumina, Inc., C.A. No. 7251-VCP (Del. Ch. Feb. 17, 2012) one of the plaintiffs 
brought a motion to expedite discovery on February 20, 2012 and did not move to be designated as 
lead plaintiff until March 1, 2012. 
 147. See generally Cain & Davidoff, A Great Game, supra note 2. 
 148. See id. 
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settlement rates and attorneys’ fee awards in a somewhat artificial way 
because the lawyers have little intention of moving forward with the case. 
Given that observation of this motive is difficult to discern, it might prove 
quite challenging to account for this effect empirically.  
Likewise, courts may be responding to increased competition through 
mechanisms other than settlement rates and attorneys’ fees. Perhaps the 
most important response that has not yet been the subject of the systematic 
comparative analysis that Cain and Davidoff perform is the rates at which 
courts grant motions to expedite. If, for example, Delaware courts have 
concerns about losing cases, an increased willingness to grant motions to 
expedite would help bring the focus of cases back to Delaware even if they 
are being litigated in other jurisdictions at the same time. By taking this 
tack, Delaware courts could remain competitive for complaints even if 
they are not increasing settlement rates or refraining from cutting agreed-
upon attorneys’ fees. 149 
Finally, it is worth exploring whether there really has been a return to 
Delaware. An alternative scenario would be that the increase of case filing 
in Delaware is an artifact of the more general increase in acquisition-
related litigation. As detailed above, the percentage of significant 
acquisitions that have produced litigation has exploded from 38.7% in 
2005
150
 to 94.2% in 2011.
151
 Similarly, the percentage of these deals 
involving litigation filed in multiple states has increased from 8.6% to 
47.4% over the same period.
152
 These trends make it likely that, even if 
Delaware were actively trying to repel litigation, more cases would be 
filed there for the simple reason that more cases are being filed 
everywhere.  
But this possible explanation only raises more questions for observers 
of corporate litigation. One of these questions is: what has the net effect of 
this increase in litigation meant for Delaware? Perhaps this trend is 
masking an ongoing net loss of cases for Delaware. Other questions 
include: how is Delaware faring in situations where multiple cases have 
been filed in multiple states? Is Delaware winning the battle for the best 
 
 
 149. To be sure, Cain and Davidoff marshal an impressive amount of data to try to control for the 
quality of cases, which may capture some of the dynamics related to placeholder complaints and the 
types of cases that are more and less likely to warrant a grant of expedited proceedings. See id. at 17–
18 (describing controls for the size of the transaction, whether the consideration was cash, the presence 
of a management buyout, the use of tender offers, whether the case had a low offer premium, and the 
number of cases filed). 
 150. Id. at 3. 
 151. Cain & Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2011, supra note 2, at 2. 
 152. Id. 
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and most interesting of these cases? The answers to these questions remain 
to be seen, although future, cross-jurisdictional studies should be able to 
shed some light on these issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Striking the right balance of authority and accountability is one of the 
defining problems of corporate law.
153
 The centralized and hierarchical 
nature of the corporation allows the board to purse the economic interests 
of a disparate group of shareholders. But this structure also creates the 
danger that managers and members of the board may privilege their own 
ends rather than those of shareholders. Shareholders have a number of 
means to hold members of the board accountable for their actions: they 
may sell their shares, they may vote their shares, or they may initate 
lawsuits that seek redress for potential violations of fiducicary duties by 
directors.
154
 These mechanisms are not perfect, but they provide 
shareholders with some means to minimize the agency costs that come 
with centralized management of the corporation. 
Litigation works to constrain directors by imposing liability when they 
act in a self-seeking way. When this litigation takes the class action and 
derivative forms it seeks to counter the agency costs created by centralized 
control of the corporation with the centralized representation of 
shareholder interests.
155
 This control often lies in the hands of the 
attorneys who direct this class action and derivative litigation. 
But just as the centralization of corporate authority creates a concern 
that management will pursue their own interests over those of 
shareholders, the centralization of litigation authority poses the potential 
threat of conflict between the aims of attorneys and those they represent.
156
 
In designing the role that litigation plays, an appropriate goal is to harness 
the ability of representative litigation to constrain corporate actors while 
 
 
 153. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary 
Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 795 (2002) (calling the “tension between the authority and 
accountability [of directors] the central problem of corporate law.”). 
 154. See Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting 
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216 (1999). 
 155. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (discussing how 
derivative lawsuits are “the chief regulator of corporate management”). 
 156. See Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, supra note 63, at 384 (noting that the “agency 
problems [associated with representative litigation] are not unlike those inherent in corporate law and 
the separation of ownership and control more generally.”); Thomas & Thompson, A Theory of 
Representative Shareholder Suits, supra note 9, at 1755 (explaining that in derivative and class action 
lawsuits “plaintiffs’ lawyers typically have a greater economic stake in the litigation than the 
individual representative shareholder, so litigation agency costs may ensue.”). 
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minimizing the agency costs created through use of the representative 
form. The current debate over how and whether to address the growth in 
multi-jurisdictional litgation that challenges acqusitions should be 
answered with this goal in mind. 
The empirical research developed in this Article and by others has 
identified two distinct Delaware trends: the migration of cases away from 
Delaware and the apparent return of cases to Delaware as part of the rise 
of concurrent, multi-jurisdictional litigation. These two trends may have 
different normative implications for optimal design of merger litigation. 
As other research has documented, Delaware used to hold a virtual 
monopoly on the adjudication of corporate claims.
157
 It is quite possible 
that the migration of some cases away from Delaware has improved the 
incentives that litigation provides through the introduction of competitive 
pressure on a quasi-monopolist.
158
 These alternative jurisdictions may be 
able to improve litigation through their application of substantive 
Delaware law or through the procedures they use to select lead counsel, 
approve attorneys’ fees, or otherwise manage litigation.159 Competition is, 
of course, no guarantee of these improvements. These alternative forums 
may apply the law or manage cases in a way that reduces the effectiveness 
of litigation as a check on agency costs. Nevertheless, there is at least a 
possibility that providing multiple fronts for litigation improves 
substantive outcomes and hones plaintiff incentives in a way that improves 
the regulatory effect of litigation. 
While the possibility of competition may have a salutary effect, the 
normative desirability of concurrent, multi-jurisdictional litigation is less 
clear. As Thomas and Thompson have argued, the details of this litigation 
often focus on the distribution of fees.
160
 This sort of pie-splitting activity 
has the potential to increase the costs of litigation to all parties. The data 
developed in this Article suggest that as multi-jurisdictional litigation has 
 
 
 157. As Chancellor Strine has noted, some may view Delaware as “a bit of a fat and happy 
monopolist.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware's Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying an 
Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar's Price Discrimination in 
the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1265 (2001). Strine makes it clear that he 
does not agree with this view. Id. at 1265–72. 
 158. Delaware, of course, faces competition from multiple sources. As Mark Roe has argued, the 
federal government is one of the most prominent sources of Delaware’s competition. See Mark J. Roe, 
Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (exploring the role of the federal government 
in corporate law). 
 159. See Thomas & Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Litigation, supra note 9, 
at 1799–1800 (explaining that one benefit of litigation on multiple fronts is that it allows states other 
than Delaware to assert their interests in corporate cases).  
 160. Id. at 1757. 
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increased, Delaware has seen an increase in the use of strategic tactics in 
the contest to split fees. These activities include the statregic filing of a 
Delaware complaint, contested consolidations, and requests for expedited 
proceedings.
161
 All of these practices, which may also be occurring in 
other states, can increase the costs on both the plaintiff and defense sides 
of these cases and also increase the administrative burden on the courts.
162
 
It may be that the costs imposed by concurrent, multi-jurisdictional 
litigation are necessary to gain any of the prospective benefits associated 
with competition among states for cases.
163
 But it may be possible to 
preserve the potential benefits of competition while casting aside some of 
the strategic behavior that does not contribute to these benefits. A system 
that allows plaintiffs to choose where to file and also permits a relatively 
quick consolidation of all cases across jurisdictions would preserve 
competition while limiting the costly tactics that this Article documents. 
At a minimum, the incidence and magnitude of strategic behavior should 
be part of the discussion of how to address this issue. 
Finally, it is worth wondering whether the changes wrought by the rise 
of multi-jurisdictional litigation may prompt changes to the way Delaware 
administers cases. The Chancery has long preferred plaintiffs’ counsel to 
operate through consensus and agreement. As competition between groups 
of plaintiffs’s attorneys becomes more pitched and takes place on multiple 
fronts, it may be more difficult for consensus to emerge. To the degree that 
Delaware’s rules facilitiate strategic behavior in this new world, there may 
be some pressure to alter rules in a way that reduces the burden that this 
strategic behavior places on parties and courts. 
 
 
 161. The focus here is on how the costs associated with strategic behavior impact the debates on 
multi-jurisdictional competition. There are other costs associated with multi-jurisdictional competition 
that are not the focus of this empiricial study. Perhaps the most prominent of these costs is the 
possibility that multi-jurisdictional litigation facilitates the practice of collusive reverse auctions 
between defense counsel and some plaintiffs’ counsel. See discussion supra note 66. 
 162. The overall effects of these strategic costs are not entirely clear. It is difficult to say, for 
example, what the desirable amount of contested consolidations is. Nevertheless, if proceedings are 
purely about dividing attorneys’ fees and produce no effect on substantive outcomes, it is difficult to 
see how such proceedings would be beneficial. 
 163. The difficulty of measuring the quality of cases being filed, and their ultimate effect on 
corporate governance, complicates any attempt to assess any proposed solutions to the rise in multi-
jurisdictional litigation. While there may be a temptation to infer that the very high percentage of 
acquisitions that result in litigation means that some of these cases are of low quality, no one has yet 
provided quantitative evidence to that effect. Moreover, as explained earlier, the overall number of 
deals that have resulted in litigation has not varied substantially in recent years, which may indicate 
that case selection is not a dire problem. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. See also 
Thomas & Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits, supra note 9, at 1788–89 
(counseling caution about inferring lawsuit quality from the types of settlements that parties reach). 
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